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Abstract 
There is a dearth of decision-support models or frameworks to aid managers in 
the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry in uniformly assessing 
the key factors in the decision to standardize innovative technologies. Making the 
proper decision is consequential and potentially fraught with risks for the firm such as 
competitive exposure, high expenditures with inadequate returns, restrictive inbound or 
outbound patent licensing obligations, and related complications.  
This study presents a framework to guide managers in the ICT industry in 
assessing the factors that inform the decision to participate in the development of 
technology standards. Using multi-criteria decision analysis and judgment data from 
panels of experts, a robust model is developed that comprehends the essential criteria 
and outcomes within the context of computer interconnect technologies. The resultant, 
generalizable model is validated against the case of the extant Universal Serial Bus (USB) 
interconnect standard and found to be congruent with the assessment of the experts.  
Scholarship on technology standards development is rich and multifaceted—
spanning numerous streams of inquiry. This research contextualizes technology 
standardization within the economic, strategic, organizational, and legal perspectives. 
The resultant model demonstrates that strategic planning is regarded by the experts as 
the principal driver in the decision to participate in a technology standardization effort.  
Furthermore, the primacy of commitment and leadership within the standards-setting 
ii 
 
organization is unambiguously established through rigorous quantitative analysis. The 
proposed model verifies that the firm’s desire to align its product roadmap to the 
emerging standard is the chief criterion in the decision to contribute to the standards 
development effort. Other criteria of high interest include the leveraging of network 
externalities to glean disruptive trends within the ecosystem, the exploration of 
opportunities to expand the total available market for the firm, and the availability and 
terms of IP licenses. Sensitivity analysis affirms the overall predictive strength and 
robustness of the model and its widespread applicability. 
Future research on model expansion and application to other technologies, as 
well as the development of uniform patent valuation methods will further enrich the 
knowledge base. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Innovative technologies produced by the ICT industry permeate all facets of 
modern human existence spanning education, scientific exploration, commerce, finance, 
law, medicine, sports, entertainment, social networks, and so on. The products that 
embody these technologies rest at the core of a vast array of devices and functions such 
as personal computers, cellular phones, communication networks, game consoles, 
digital media players, high-performance computers that form the backbone of the 
Internet, “cloud” services, controllers in modern automobiles and airplanes, mission-
critical systems, industrial, medical and life-support equipment, point-of-sale registers 
and scanners in retail stores, electronic billboards and so on.  
ICT firms such as Apple, Cisco, Google, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, 
Qualcomm, Samsung and others hold dominant positions in this industry—an industry 
that has been characterized by some scholars as “winner-take-all.”1 Ironically, in this 
dynamic, high-velocity industry no technology firm is “an island, entire of itself.” This is 
especially true of firms whose products depend on technology standards.  
A standard represents consensus among different agents operating within 
mutually acceptable practices. Thus, a technology standard can be rendered as an 
arrangement that enforces conformance of all elements of products, processes, 
formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction.2  
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Technology standardization reduces product incompatibility, increases 
interoperability, and accelerates broad diffusion and adoption of innovations in the ICT 
industry. A technology-intensive product such as a smartphone or a personal computer 
is built with many protected intellectual assets such as patents that are held by any 
number of ICT firms. While some firms may own impressive portfolios of intellectual 
assets, no one firm owns all of the patents involved in building a smartphone, a personal 
computer, or other complex devices.  
The ideas and methods described by patents find their way into technology 
standards which are eventually adopted in a variety of products. However, as the 
complexities of technology markets and the uniform adoption of standards are too 
daunting for any ICT firm to influence or direct on its own, many firms are faced with IP-
related uncertainties.3 
To develop leading-edge, interoperable products ICT firms enter into standards 
coalitions to gain access to a broader array of intellectual assets, to interact with ready 
ecosystems of partners and complementors and to gain a voice in influencing the pace 
and direction of technology standards development. While beneficial, participation in 
SDOs can be fraught with risks that are poorly understood and seldom mitigated by 
these firms. How do ICT firms decide whether or not to join a standards development 
effort? This and related questions are explored and addressed in this treatise.  
This study is organized as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the topic, provides a 
taxonomy and definition of terms, identifies the problems and explains the motivations 
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for the research. Chapter 2 gives a broad survey of the academic literature, including 
various streams of direct and related inquiry. Chapter 3 outlines the gaps in the 
literature as well as the research questions that address these gaps. Chapter 4 explains 
the research methodology. Chapter 5 defines the decision model and the various levels 
of its hierarchy. Chapter 6 describes the design and framework of research, data 
collection, and cases analysis. Chapter 7 outlines the results and the sensitivity analysis 
performed on them. Chapter 8 furnishes a discussion of the findings as well as their 
import and implications. Chapter 9 summarizes the conclusions derived from the 
research, enumerates the limitations encountered during the research, and concludes 
with an agenda for future scholarly endeavors. References appear at the end of the 
document. 
1.1 Overview of Technology Standardization 
Without standardization there wouldn’t be a modern economy!4 This bold 
assertion is not entirely hyperbolic. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of technological 
innovation occurs within the multi-invention context of standards, without which we 
could not uniformly use a wall outlet to power our electrical gadgets, fit the nozzle at 
any filling station into our automobile fuel tank, seamlessly and uninterruptedly use the 
services of transnational railways, swipe our debit or credit card at any retail store, use 
our computer to connect to the Internet for the electronic exchange of personal or 
commercial information and so on.  
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Likewise, users of technology-intensive products share and exchange 
information through compatible documents, databases and related interoperable tools 
provided by different vendors, all of which are built on foundations laid by technology 
standards. The QWERTY keyboard is a ubiquitous example of a timely and useful 
technology standard.5  
The standardization of technological innovations is deemed sufficiently crucial to 
prompt government authorities in nearly all developed and emerging economies into 
taking an active interest in the establishment and guidance of national and international 
standards-setting organizations, and in evolving laws to institutionalize their charters, 
policies and practices.6 One need not look farther than the Internet to be convinced of 
the crucial importance of technology standards as building blocks for a wide range of 
commercial and non-commercial applications.7  
Thus, it is clear that standards are sine qua non in all facets of consumer and 
corporate life. Many benefits accrue to the producer and to the consumer of standards-
based technology products. For the producer, standards enable the broad adoption of 
its products and hasten additional innovations through coordination with a network of 
collaborators that supply complementary products and services. For the consumer, 
standards foster early access to innovations and provide a tacit promise of 
interoperability among products and services from a heterogeneous mix of vendors.  
Technology standards development can be a strategic activity for many firms in 
the ICT industry since it promotes distributed innovation and inter-firm collaboration. 
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Adherence to technology standards is critical for building modular and interoperable 
products. It allows firms to concentrate on innovations that add incremental or unique 
value. To wit, keystone firms rely on standards as a means to reduce investments 
through distributed innovation while concomitantly preserving their technology 
leadership. Standards spawn complementary innovations that enhance the value of 
interoperable products emanating from a horizontally disintegrated ecosystem.8  
Firms that lead in the development of technology standards are ahead of the 
pack on the path to dominant market positions; indeed in some cases they become the 
standard.9 Consider, for instance, that in 2009 Microsoft held sway over 94 percent of 
the global desktop operating system market, Intel had roughly 83 percent market 
segment share in PC microprocessors and Apple dominated more than 82 percent of the 
portable music market. However, the perceived best technology does not always gain 
prominence or become a de facto standard. The ICT industry is witness to many failures, 
including the IBM PS/2 operating system and the Apple Newton personal digital 
assistant. 
Technology standards eliminate incompatibility between similar products from 
different vendors, and thereby enhance the overall value of the offering by enabling the 
incremental supplementation of features and functions to basic “vanilla” products.10 
This value is a consequence of the network effects engendered through the process of 
technology standards development by firms that provide complementary products and 
services that conform to these technology standards.11  
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Standardization plays a crucial role in the broad diffusion of technological 
innovations. Arguably, standards accelerate technology adoption by enabling “the 
timely deployment of value-added functionality, followed by the broadest possible 
industry support for the necessary infrastructure to deliver the next level of 
innovations.”12  
If a technology can be instantiated in multiple different ways with dissimilar 
interface points, there is the potential for proliferation of incongruent methods for 
accomplishing the same task or end result. Such proliferations in turn can lead to 
inefficiencies and lower returns for the firm or to confusion and higher costs for the 
consumer, or to both. Thus, technology standards are essential for the coherence of 
research investments as well as the compatibility and interplay of heterogeneous 
offerings from multiple product integrators worldwide.13  
Technology standards are infused with the intellectual assets and the protected 
innovations of firms that may or may not participate in the definition and diffusion of 
such standards. Every technology-intensive product contains a multitude of standards-
based technologies that are covered by some form of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
regime.14  
The rents accrued from the licensing of IP constitute sizeable revenue streams 
for many firms in the ICT industry. For example, IBM has historically earned a sizeable 
portion of its total annual revenues from royalties derived from the licensing of its large 
and diverse IP portfolio.15 16 In 2009, it was estimated that IBM earned well over $3-4 
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billion in licensing revenues from its IP portfolio, and that sum is on the rise.17 
Qualcomm has a similarly lucrative revenue stream from the licensing of its IP portfolio. 
In 2011 it racked up over $6 billion in IP royalties.18 19 This sum is noteworthy since in 
2007 IP-related earnings accounted for only a third of Qualcomm revenues. Other ICT 
firms are replicating this recipe for revenue growth and strategic advantage. Table 1 
depicts the top 5 ICT firms being awarded patents in the United States in 2011:20 
Table 1 - Top 5 ICT firms awarded U.S. patents in 2011. 
Rank Firm Number of Patents Awarded 
1 IBM 6,478 
2 Samsung 5,081 
3 Canon 3,174 
4 Sony 3,032 
5 Panasonic 2,769 
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1.2 The Nature and Scope of the Problem 
Technology firms invest in Research and Development (R&D) which invariably 
results in the creation of IP that is safeguarded by the firm and protected by regional, 
national and international law. Much of this IP consistently finds its way into technology 
standards as a result of inter-firm collaboration and contribution during the process of 
standards definition and development.  
The complex phenomenon of the integration of IP from various sources into 
innovative products via multiple technology standards is depicted in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1 - Propagation of IP in technology products through standards. 
To ensure fair and equal access to the essential IP required for building 
compliant and interoperable products, organizations that develop technology standards 
manage and administer Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) as part of their charter as 
outlined in bylaws or similar legal instruments. All members of these organizations are 
bound by the same rules and policies.  
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The privileges and obligations that IPR policies bestow on the licensor and the 
licensee, respectively, vary in clarity of scope and linguistic precision, and are usually 
non-uniform across different organizations, national laws or international agreements.21 
In the ICT industry a firm’s position in the innovation chain, whether upstream to 
IP innovation or downstream to it, is a major factor in determining licensing and royalty 
policies.22 Another concern is the size of the firm, where small and medium entities 
(SMEs) have a more intense need to protect their intellectual assets in order to ensure 
their long-term survival.23 
The accelerated pace of innovation in the ICT industry, the increasing complexity 
of semiconductor and software technologies, the changing shape of markets, the 
fluctuating positions and ranks of various firms and other market uncertainties, 
combinationally can hinder innovation through standardization.24  
Standards setting organizations usually operate without regard to the 
imperatives that drive business priorities. Thus the friction inherent in the co-evolution 
of standards organizations and IPR policies in the ICT industry is real and unchecked. In 
particular, tensions can escalate when the instantiation of a standard calls for the 
integration of protected IP whose holder will either not grant a license or may require 
exorbitant rents. Such outcomes can result in revisions to the standard to remove the IP, 
which concomitantly elevates risk, uncertainty and inefficiency.  
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1.3 Terminology and Taxonomy 
Familiarization with commonly used technical terms and their descriptions may 
prove instructive before delving deeper into the subject at hand. There are many 
definitions for what constitutes a technology standard as outlined below: 
a) “A specification or a design with a dominant market position in the industry for its 
product class.”25 
b) “A common language that promotes the flow of goods between buyer and seller …” 
and the process of standardization is the pursuit of conformity of all elements of 
products, processes, formats, or procedures that make up an industry standard, with 
the objective of increasing the efficiency of economic activity within a generally 
defined industry or narrowly defined sub-sector of an industry.26 
c) “A technological format that has been agreed to by either one firm or a set of firms, 
that has come into existence, may be promoted as a basis for reference and use 
outside the firm(s), and/or at least one or more of the relevant potential users have 
adopted the format.”27 
d) “A formulation established verbally, in writing or by any other graphical method, or 
by means of a model, sample or other physical means of representation, to serve 
during a certain period of time for defining, designing or specifying certain features 
of a unit or basis of measurement, a physical object, an action, a process, a method, 
a practice, a capacity, a function, a duty, a right, a responsibility, a behavior, an 
attitude, a concept or a conception, or a combination of any of these, with the 
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object of promoting economy and efficiency in production, disposal, regulation 
and/or utilization of goods and services, by providing a common ground of 
understanding among producers, dealers, consumers, users, technologists and other 
groups concerned.”28 
Furthermore, technology standards can be classified into three kinds: reference, 
minimum quality, and interface.  
Reference and minimum quality standards indicate that a product conforms to 
the content and level of certain defined characteristics, whereas interface standards 
provide the requisite aplomb that an intermediate product can be successfully 
incorporated into a larger system given specified inputs and outputs.29  
The establishment of technology standards comes about either through 
unsponsored activities where no identified originator holds a proprietary interest, or 
sponsored activities where one or more entities hold a direct interest, or agreements 
facilitated through organizations, or governmental mandates.  
Unsponsored and sponsored activities emerge through market-mediated 
processes and are generally referred to as de facto standards, whereas agreements and 
governmental mandates emerge through political deliberations or administrative 
procedures and are generally referred to as de jure standards. This classification is 
shown in Table 2 below: 
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Table 2 - The typology of SDOs (David, 1987). 
Type Output Explanation 
de facto 
Unsponsored standard 
Specifications with no identified originator holding a 
proprietary interest 
Sponsored standard 
Specifications with one or more identified originators holding 
proprietary interest 
de jure 
Contracted standard 
Specifications developed and published by a voluntary 
standards developing organization 
Mandated standard 
Specifications promulgated by governmental agencies with 
regulatory authority 
 
 Throughout this study, therefore, a de facto standard will refer to that which is 
developed by loosely formed consortia of technology firms with a vested interest in its 
adoption and diffusion, while a de jure standard will refer to that which is developed by 
a formal consortium or authority-wielding agency of a national government or an 
internationally recognized association. The extent of this study embraces de facto 
technology standards that are defined and promulgated in the ICT industry as this is an 
acutely under-researched area.  
The American Society for Testing and Materials, now ASTM International, 
identifies four types of standards as shown in Table 3 below:30 
Table 3 - Types of standards (ASTM International, 2005). 
Standard Description Participants 
Company 
Consensus among employees of an 
organization (i.e. a business firm) 
Some or all employees of the company 
Consortium 
Consensus among a small group of like-
minded firms 
Some or all participating members of the 
consortium 
Industry 
Consensus among a large group of firms 
within an association of firms or an 
industry 
Some or all participating members of the 
industry 
Government 
Consensus enforced by government 
mandate or policy 
Some or all entities with business 
interest within the jurisdiction of the 
government 
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1.4 Intellectual Assets 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) defines Intellectual 
Property (IP) as “creations of the mind - creative works or ideas embodied in a form that 
can be shared or can enable others to recreate, emulate, or manufacture them.”31 
Patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets are distinct ways that firms or 
individuals may protect their intellectual assets.  
Patents describe novel and non-obvious inventions and gives its owner exclusive 
rights to exploit that invention. Copyrights protect creative expressions such as books, 
music, software programs and other such creations. Trademarks provide unique and 
differentiable identity to a brand, logo or other such constructions. Trade secrets, unlike 
the other forms of intellectual assets, are kept confidential and are not disclosed. They 
are the unique methods, designs, formulations, and other such inventions that the firm 
considers to be too important to be made public.32 
A patent grants the inventor exclusive rights for a limited period of time in 
exchange for public disclosure of the invention. Patents are of various types such as 
Design, Dress, Plant, Utility and others. The design of an automotive engine is a good 
example of a component that is protected under multiple patents. A Plant patent covers 
distinct, sexually produced plants with a variety of cultivation techniques, new seedlings 
or other original advances. A Dress patent covers the visible look, feel, appearance or 
packaging of a product, while a Utility patent covers a new machine, process 
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manufacture or composition of matter. The bulk of the patents in the ICT industry are of 
the Utility type and thus they form the locus of this study. 
A copyright grants exclusive right to the holder to copy or distribute the 
protected material for a limited period of time in exchange for public disclosure. Books, 
movies, technology specifications and software are typical examples of copyrighted IP.  
A trademark is a unique name, logo or image used to distinguish the source of 
the product offering and to promote brand identity. The Apple “bitten” logo, the Nike 
“swoosh” logo and the NBC tri-note chime are examples of well-known trademarks.  
A trade secret is classified information held by a firm or legal entity and is used in 
the creation of product offerings. Given its confidential nature, a trade secret is not 
publicly disclosed. The design of circuits in microprocessor chips or the formulae used in 
soft drinks, such as Coca Cola, are typical examples of trade secrets. Sans trade secrets, 
these intellectual assets are summarized in Table 4:33 
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Table 4 - Summary of intellectual assets (Metzger, 1992). 
Feature Patent Copyright Trademark 
Scope of 
protection 
Novel, non-obvious and 
useful inventions 
Wide range of creative 
works that are fixed and 
original 
Trademarks, service marks, 
certification marks, and 
collective marks of 
sufficient distinctiveness 
Registration 
requirement 
Yes Copyright exists absent 
registration; registration 
necessary for infringement 
suit 
Unregistered marks 
protected under section 
43(a); registration 
necessary for infringement 
suit under section 32(1) 
Duration 17 years from issuance 
or 20 years from filing  
Life of author plus 70 years 10 years, with possible 10-
year renewals 
Transferability  By assignment or license By assignment or license Limited  
Infringement Making, using or selling 
patented invention or its 
substantial equivalent 
Violation of owner’s 
exclusive right to produce, 
prepare derivative works, 
distribute copies, perform 
or display; fair use defense 
available 
Use of mark in connection 
with advertisement or sale 
that is likely to cause 
confusion, mistake or 
deception regarding origin 
  
Patents, the focus of this study, were originally established by the medieval 
Venetian state in 1474 which defined the basic features of the law still in practice today. 
The intent behind the law was to spur innovation through the incentive of limited-time 
exclusivity. In 1787 the United States Constitutional Convention recommended that 
Congress be given the power to promote the progress of sciences and useful arts by 
securing to the inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive right to his inventions. This 
recommendation was unanimously adopted and incorporated into the final draft of the 
United States Constitution.34 The importance of the patenting system as a source of 
economic return for innovative firms has been documented in the scholarly literature.35  
Two distinct views are germane when considering a portfolio of intellectual 
assets such as patents. The portfolio can be viewed as a defense or shield-like 
mechanism and used primarily for protection by the firm against competition through 
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cross-licensing arrangements as a hedge against potential patent assertion or 
infringement suit. This allows the firm to maintain focus on its core business of 
generating value through commercialization of innovations. On the other hand, the 
portfolio can be viewed as an offensive or sword-like mechanism and used primarily as a 
revenue-generating asset by the firm. In this way, firms can assert their rights and derive 
revenue through licensing rents and royalties, entering into joint ventures and other 
strategic ventures. This allows the firm to harvest value from the exploitation of its 
intellectual assets.36 This IP portfolio strategy is depicted in Table 5: 
Table 5 - IP portfolio strategy. 
Consideration Portfolio-as-Protection Portfolio-as-Asset 
Strategy Defensive (used as a “shield”) Offensive (used as a “sword”) 
Usage 
The firm can protect itself from 
competitive attack 
The firm can derive value or position 
itself for joint ventures 
Application 
Protection from patent infringement 
suits through cross-licensing 
Source of revenue through licensing 
rents, joint ventures, etc. 
Benefit 
Allows the firm to focus on core 
business and to commercialize its 
innovations 
Allows the firm to harvest value from 
the exploitation of its intellectual 
assets 
 
The adoption of technology standards entails the process of design, 
implementation and seamless inter-operation of heterogeneous products from a variety 
of firms. The computing industry, comprehending IT goods and services such as personal 
computers, operating systems, databases, and so on, and the communications industry, 
comprehending telecommunications goods and services such smartphones, data or 
media services, and so on, have historically operated with different assumptions and 
requirements with regard to IP contributions in technology standards. It requires no 
further elaboration that these two industries have recently blended together, leaving 
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open a number of vexing questions about the cross-dependent and dissonant strategies 
of many firms that operate across multiple industrial boundaries. 
1.5 Standards Developing Organizations 
An SDO, sometimes referred to as Standards Setting Organization (SSO), 
operates under the aegis and sponsorship of a consortium of like-minded firms or a 
national organization, and may draw its membership through representation from a 
variety of firms, institutions or individuals with an interest in the field. Examples of SDOs 
include IEEE, ANSI and ECMA. An International Standards Developing Organization 
(ISDO) operates at the multi-national level with representation determined by a national 
organization, governmental bureau or imprimatur, and generally carries a high level of 
legitimacy and influence. Examples of ISDOs include ISO and ITU. SDOs and ISDOs 
generally issue de jure technology standards.37  
A Special Interest Group (SIG) is a special-purpose, legally constituted 
consortium of firms to advance the collaborative development of narrowly-focused 
technology specifications. By construct, a SIG is an informal and decentralized standards 
developing association. As an incorporated, legally recognized entity, a SIG may operate 
as a mutual-benefit, non-profit corporation with bylaws, a governing board, elected 
officers and so on, similar to most SDOs.38 In the United States, for instance, a tax-
exempt SIG is legally recognized under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.39 
Examples of SIGs include Bluetooth and USB. SIGs generally issue de facto standards.40 
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On the origin of technology standards consortia in the ICT industry, Hawkins 
(1999) maintains that the first such consortium was formed in Europe in 1963 called the 
European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA).41 ECMA defined much of the 
organizational practices of SDOs in use today and was held in high regard by 
international organizations such as the ISO and the ITU. These practices include 
membership rules, IPR policies, committee processes, finances, specification 
development procedures, and so on.  
It took changes in US laws starting in 1988, specifically the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act and the 1993 National Cooperative Research and Production Act, 
that encouraged closer collaboration among American technology firms to develop 
standards within the structure of SDOs. Figure 3 below depicts the SDO taxonomy 
discussed herein: 
 
Figure 2 - SDO taxonomy. 
Technology standards mitigate technical uncertainty, lower transaction costs, 
increase the efficiency of information sharing among participants, reduce trial and error 
in design and improve overall productivity.42  
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The collective learning infused through network externalities and ecosystems 
reduce “nonstrategic sources of variety in design” by providing focus and clarity in a sea 
of technological options.43 However, the convergence of the computing and 
communications industries and the incongruency of the prevalent IPR policies governing 
the standards organizations in each of these market segments, together with the growth 
of IP-related problems such as undeclared essential IP in standards, vague ex post 
licensing terms and royalty expectations, “troll” or “non-practicing” firms, “holdups,” 
“ambushes” and the growing number of IP-related law suits in recent years, pose 
serious financial and strategic challenges to firms that wish to operate across industrial 
boundaries.44  
Moreover, the omnipresent potential of collusion in standards organizations, the 
repercussions of antitrust law, as well as the economic impact of IP-induced injunctions 
on commerce can be distracting, if not debilitating, to technology firms irrespective of 
size or market power.45  
1.6 Risks and Issues in Technology Standardization 
As technological diffusion through standardization comes into conflict with the 
assertion of IPR, innovation and leadership are jeopardized, giving rise to potentially 
dire consequences for many firms. Working around IP holdups and minefields is a risky 
proposition since it is not clear if the innovation that replaces it is adequate and 
available. This in turn results in confusion over the marketability of the technology and 
to delays in the adoption and diffusion of the standard.  
- 20 - 
 
Many ICT firms view IPR as a “necessary evil” owing to the requisite investments 
in building and protecting IP portfolios for defensive purposes while resorting to other 
means to recoup investments in standards-based innovations.46 Many other problems 
persist, including the undeclared ownership of IP within standards organizations to 
prevent inadvertent infringement, IP monetization, royalty stacking, and so on. 
Acknowledging these issues, the United States Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission released a joint report in 2007 aimed at the promotion of 
innovation and competition by issuing clarifications over IPR antitrust enforcement.47 
Also in 2007, the European Commission began to probe several questionable IP-related 
practices on the parts of RAMBUS and Qualcomm after complaints were lodged against 
those companies alleging breach of rules and unfair exploitations of IPR.48  
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), developed by the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), with a broad scope to define 
the technical specifications for digital cellular networks, brought many of these issues to 
the forefront on a global scale starting in the late-1980s and into the 1990s.49  
More recent examples that embody IPR infringement comprise high-profile law 
suits, including the cases of the BlackBerry smartphone and the Apple iPhone. In the 
case of the former, BlackBerry was found to have infringed on patents held by a small 
company called NTP, among others, which was at first awarded $53 million but 
BlackBerry fiercely resisted payment. Having exhausted all of its legal appeal options, 
BlackBerry eventually settled for over $600 million, a nearly twelve-fold penalty!50 In the 
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case of the latter, Apple was sued by cell phone giant Nokia, again for patent 
infringement. Apple fought back but eventually settled for an undisclosed amount 
believed to be around 2 percent of iPhone sales plus ongoing royalties.51 Other 
examples that portend of the “IP wars” phenomenon include Apple vs. Samsung, Oracle 
vs. Google, Microsoft vs. Motorola and many other such entanglements.52 53 54 
In the ICT industry many firms are entangled in “IP wars” over infringement and 
licensing issues. For example, Apple was sued by Nokia and is in turn suing Samsung. 
Apple and Google have locked horns many times over the past few years. Google 
acquired the Motorola Mobility patent portfolio to buttress its IP holdings and Microsoft 
followed suit with its purchase of the Nokia patent portfolio. Oracle and Google are in 
litigation over various IP-related issues, and the list goes on. This litigious environment 
represents a recent phenomenon in the ICT industry which has been attributed to the 
increasing value of intellectual assets and the unwillingness of large IP portfolio owners 
to enter into cross-licensing arrangements or to join SDOs.  
With the stated uncertainties over the protected intellectual assets of innovating 
firms, the incongruency of IPR regimes in the various standards organizations and the 
dependence of ICT products on a growing number of technology standards, what 
challenges await firms whose products contain inventions couched in numerous 
technologies that span multiple standards and IPR policies?  
The complexity of this problem amplifies with the requirement for product 
interoperability across a broad spectrum of offerings from multiple vendors, many of 
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whom are rivals and not readily cooperative. There are a number of other problems 
enumerated in the following sections that span a broad spectrum from the 
acknowledged to the obdurate. 
Many patent-related problems are known, albeit not adequately addressed. 
These problems include ambush, holdup, thicket, vague licensing terms, and so on.55  
An ambush arises when the owner of essential IP knowingly contributes it, prima 
facie, without asserting any rights or claiming that it will not assert rights, only to 
change course and assert rights after products have implemented the essential IP. The 
case of RAMBUS Incorporated illustrates this problem.56  
A holdup arises when the owner of essential IP refuses to license irrespective of 
rents and royalties, and thus shackles the products that depend on that IP and 
ultimately impedes innovation. The case of Dell Corporation typifies this problem.57  
A thicket materializes when the essential IP is embedded as part of a web of 
overlapping IP which complicates isolation of the essential IP and gives rise to confusion 
and the “stacking” of multiple assets from multiple sources, thereby curbing imitators 
and impeding innovation. The case of Xerox Corporation exemplifies this problem.58  
Collusion and antitrust issues can develop when multiple influential firms 
cooperate among themselves to define the rules of standardization and IPR policies to 
the exclusion of the broader ecosystem, including their closest rivals, thus giving 
themselves an unfair advantage by erecting barriers to innovation and competition. 
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Standards-based product development necessitates careful management and 
navigation around a plethora of technological, commercial and legal risks. When 
choosing a technology standard, a firm must pay close attention to economic models 
that measure risk. These models take into account the number of firms active in the 
initiative since firm size and the number of participating firms has an effect on the 
market risk as accounted for by a change in the  value as well as the idiosyncratic risk 
as represented by a change in the Mean Square Error (MSE).59 The value is a measure 
of the volatility of an entity, such as a firm’s stock value, in relation to the collective, 
such as an index or a market of other stocks, whereas the MSE is a measure of the 
difference between an estimating function and the estimated quantity.60 In general, 
firms electing to participate in large standardization efforts can expect a reduction in 
market risks but an increase in idiosyncratic risks when compared to firms choosing to 
participate in smaller standards group or attempting to unilaterally standardize their 
own technologies and products.  
At the industry level, incongruent IPR licensing terms across SDOs or those that 
are ambiguous and open to interpretation engender a raft of problems that are without 
precedent and thus carry indeterminate risk for ICT firms. For example, the term 
“reasonable” in the Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (RAND) IPR policy is imprecise 
and open to interpretation. The owner of the essential IP can demand uniform rents 
that may be reasonable in one industry but not in another, thus giving it a legally 
accepted tool to limit competition in carefully chosen industries and market segments.  
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At the firm level, the problem of IP valuation gives rise to a number of strategic 
and commercial risks with broad implications for technology managers, absent a 
universally applicable IP valuation method. The fecundity of this area of scholarship is 
acknowledged but understood to be out-of-scope for this treatise.  
1.7 Technology Standards Development 
A technology standard is developed and maintained by a consortium of 
representative firms, individuals or legal entities operating within an industry. In the ICT 
industry, for instance, there are a number of standards organizations with varying levels 
of openness, authority, influence, charter and function.  
In this context, openness refers to the degree of availability of participation to an 
individual, a legal entity, a firm or a governmental agency. Further, the development of 
technology standards must meet several goals such as the proper form, fit and function 
of the products built to the standard, the precise definition of compliance to facilitate 
the interoperability of products, and, most importantly, the lowest possible cost in the 
development of standards-based products.61  
Since technology standards development entails the integration of protected IP, 
the implementation of the standard may give rise to IP infringement in the absence of a 
licensing regime. The production of low-cost, standards-based products thus 
necessitates availability and affordability of licenses to the essential IP required for its 
implementation. 
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Several factors interact in the complex, multi-dimensional undertaking of 
technology standards development such as business-driven innovation, IPR protection 
and enforcement, organizational and institutional structures and practices, and the 
regulatory environment spanning consumer and environmental protections.62  
Inter-firm cooperation within the context of a SDO represents the ultimate 
evolution of a collaborative structure due to its ability to retain broad representation of 
vested firms in the industry.63  
Technology standards development follows a lifecycle comprised of three 
phases: Development, Diffusion, and Adoption.64  
In the Development phase, the technical content of the standard is created. The 
issue in this phase centers on the ownership and licensing of the IP. Firms are motivated 
to know who owns what piece of essential IP.  
In the Diffusion phase, the technology standard is broadly disseminated to the 
ecosystem. The issue in this phase is the protection and retention of the value of the IP 
contained in the standard. Firms are motivated by the revenue potential of licensing the 
essential IP they hold.  
In the Adoption phase, the technology standard is instantiated in various product 
offerings. The issue in this phase has to do with compliance to the published standard 
and whether or not any firm in the ecosystem holds a privilege or advantage in this 
regard. Firms are motivated by the process and timing of conformance to gain time-to-
market advantage over their rivals.  
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1.8 Intellectual Property Rights Models  
IP protection and license availability is an intrinsic aspect of technology 
standards development. The monetary potential for IP is sufficient motivation for the 
holder of these intellectual assets to devise elaborate policies to protect them from 
unwanted or illegal use. There are on-going conflicts between industrialized and 
developing regions of the world, and the controversies surrounding the variant levels of 
protection of intellectual assets.65 
There exists a variety of IPR models in the ICT industry which span the polar 
opposites of “no license” to “free license.” The former is clear: the IP holder has no 
motivation or obligation to license its intellectual assets to any entity in any manner. 
The latter is equally clear: the IP holder has no intention to bar any entity from using its 
intellectual assets and will not impose any monetary obligations for its use. However, 
most IP holders use other models that grant them the potential to derive monetary gain 
should they choose to assert their rights to the essential IP in their possession. 
The IPR model is set by the standards setting organization and it plays a crucial 
role in the diffusion and adoption of the technology standard defined by the 
organization. Typically, it meets several conditions such as identifying the scope of the 
essential patent(s), including the unambiguous availability of license terms covering the 
patent(s), and providing commitment to license the essential patent(s). 
While the IPR policies of the various ISDOs, SDOs and SIGs are not always 
uniform, most organizations have gravitated towards the RAND licensing policy as it is 
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the most preferred option available. There are variations in RAND, such as RAND with 
royalty-free (RAND-RF) terms, sometimes referred to as RAND with zero royalty (RAND-
Z), and others such as RAND with covenant not to sue (RAND-CNTS). 
The “non-discriminatory” part of RAND is clear: IP licensing must be available to 
all takers. The “reasonable” part of RAND, however, is not clear and is subject to varying 
interpretations. There is no uniform semantic for reasonableness, especially across 
industrial boundaries. This is one example of the difficulty in setting and adhering to an 
IPR policy. On the other end of the scale, the “Just Publish” model is rarely used as it can 
expose the adopter to potentially onerous terms, and it does not meet the 
aforementioned criteria. In this model the owner makes the IP in question publicly 
available with or without the protections afforded by law and may, at an indeterminate 
time, assert rights against it absent prior notice. The increased uncertainty inherent in 
this model renders it unpopular. 
1.9 Research Motivation 
The co-evolution of IPR policies with standards setting organizations in the ICT 
industry and the uncertainties and challenges posed by these trends has the potential to 
hinder technological innovation and the free flow of information across firm boundaries. 
Technology standardization is beset by IP concerns that create conflict and pose 
challenges for technology managers. Much of these threats emanate from the nuanced 
differences in the entrenched IPR models across standards developing organizations. 
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Moreover, IPR policy impacts competition in a number of ways such as the pace of 
innovation and its impact on the evolution of market structures.66  
The ineffectiveness of static structures, such as antitrust enforcement, in a 
dynamic and evolving setting like the ICT industry highlights the need for vigilance in 
managing the relationship between competition policy and IPR.67 My motivation in 
undertaking this research is to probe the various considerations that inform the decision 
to participate in SDOs by ICT firms and to develop a decision-support model to fill an 
existing void. Reliable and generalizable models to guide decisions on technology 
standardization and IP portfolio valuation, and their integration into the firm’s 
innovation strategy, have not received adequate scholarly attention. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The literature on the impact of standards development on product and process 
innovation builds on the groundbreaking work of Utterback and Abernathy (1975), in 
which they recorded patterns of innovation within technology firms and developed 
various models to explain the rate of innovation of products and processes on the basis 
of the firm’s chosen business and competitive strategy.68 One of the main upshots of 
this research suggests that technology firms race to propagate their own 
implementation of a technological innovation in order to establish de facto standards 
which others will have to emulate. In applying the Utterback and Abernathy model to 
the firm’s strategic alliances, Mauri and McMillan (1999) find that technology-intensive 
firms form alliances as the level of technology complexity and cross-dependencies 
increase.69 Their findings buttress the Uterback and Abernathy product and process 
innovation models and contradict a large body of research which contends that 
technology firms avoid alliances to protect their intellectual assets from exploitative and 
opportunistic behaviors of their rivals, partners and others in their ecosystem. In the 
sections below, I shall detail the mainstream literature on technology standardization as 
well as provide a brief review of some supporting streams of inquiry. 
2.1 Mainstream Standards Literature 
David and Greenstein (1990) catalog a comprehensive survey of literature on 
technology standardization with a focus on the economics of compatibility standards.70 
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One of the main themes emerging from their study highlights the so-called “bandwagon 
effects” which explicates the economic gains from the coordination of different agents 
to achieve interoperability of components within a system. This is the phenomenon 
where ICT managers mimic the technology standardization behaviors and actions of 
keystone firms without deep analysis of their implications. 
Another theme is centered on the concept of “positive feedback,” where the 
increased adoption of a technology standard reinforces even broader adoption over 
time. This finding poses an interesting question: given positive feedback, will the market 
gravitate towards optimal standards on its own? When a presumably new compatibility 
standard is introduced, is it systemically bound for failure in its formulation, adoption 
and evolution? These researchers point out that markets which are characterized by 
consumption externalities do not always an optimal choice in a technology standard 
since choices made by early adopters wield an unduly large influence over late adopters.  
Ozsomer and Cavusgil (2000) discuss the effects of technology standardization 
on network externalities and show that once a standard has emerged its rapid adoption 
can trigger competition in the short term leading to lower cost in the long term.71 Zhu, 
et al. (2005) examine how network effects promote the diffusion of technology 
standards through switching costs and path dependencies by developing an integrative 
model that includes influential factors in the migration to open standards, and argue for 
migration from proprietary to open standards across organizational boundaries.72  
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The importance of technology standards development for the purpose of 
reinvigorating the US economy and renewing the competitiveness of US technology 
firms is strongly emphasized by Burnside and Witkin (2008) who confirm the futility of 
the go-it-alone approach and point to alarming statistics concerning the decline of US 
technological prowess.73 For instance, measured as a percentage, in 2004 the US was 
overtaken in the issuance of science and engineering degrees by China, Japan and 
Ireland. Further, in 2005 US R&D as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
below that of China, Ireland, Russia and the EU. These researches contend that the lack 
of an IP licensing arrangement between university R&D and the industry is the key 
obstacle in maintaining a steady flow of technological innovation and business 
collaboration. These findings parallel the contention of Cohen, et al. (2002), that patent 
spillover and associated R&D diffusion is stronger in Japan than in the U. S.74 Echoing 
similar sentiments, Pisano and Shih (2009) draw a bleak picture of the gradual decline of 
the US technology industry in its inability to produce its own innovations and 
inventions.75 These researchers call for focused research and development as well as 
closer collaboration between business, academia and government to restore US 
technological competitiveness. This advice hearkens to a few decades back when a 
similar alarm was sounded over the declining US prowess in semiconductor 
manufacturing, which gave birth to the collaborative arrangement called Sematech.76  
As a consortium of the leading semiconductor manufacturing firms, Sematech 
members pool their research and development in a collaborative manner for the benefit 
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of the consortium in order to ward off the perceived unfair advantages of government-
subsidized R&D by overseas competitors.77 Collaborative innovation is not alien to 
American firms. However, the evolving process of technological change has a profound 
effect on the development, diffusion and adoption of technology standards.78  
In studying the increasingly rapid pace of technological innovation, Coyle (2005) 
finds that technology standards can pace innovation by providing stability in a time of 
constant change.79 Thus, standards organizations must maintain a steady beat rate of 
technological innovation and reach across other standards organizations for 
coordination and influence to build consistency and dependency within the ecosystem. 
Using the paradigm of a pyramid, Coyle maintains that technology standards form its 
base through which firms can specialize in the development of tools and other 
technology-based products to enable the development of more advanced innovations 
and applications, a layer above on the pyramid.  
Consider that semiconductor manufacturers rely on a host of sophisticated 
factory tools, such as reliability and measurement equipment, to streamline and 
automate their operations. In turn, these tools may be based on certain standards in 
order to engender multiple sourcing and choice. Thus, technology standards facilitate 
competition as well as innovation. 
In an award-winning study on the diffusion of competing standards in two-sided 
markets, Sun and Tse (2006) find that network effects overshadow technological 
superiority in determining the outcome of conflicting standards, in that strong network 
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effects locked in an inferior standard even though a superior standard was available.80 
This implies that in defining technology standards new entrants must have superior 
technologies or financial resources to succeed as latecomers or when there is already a 
standard in place. By coining terms such as “single-home” (i.e. the adoption of one 
standard by a firm) and “multi-home” (i.e. the adoption of multiple standards by a firm) 
these researchers draw distinctions between a variety of models where a given standard 
can merely survive in the face of multiple options or completely dominate the field and 
drive out other standards. One clear implication from this study is particularly 
instructive: the tendency to multi-home will result in multiple standards, but there will 
be a gradual convergence of multiple standards towards a harmonious steady state. The 
reigning in of a potentially obstreperous environment into focus and predictability is 
requisite to the organic evolution of a business ecosystem. In this manner, a firm that is 
contemplating investing in technology standards development or participating in an 
existing standards activity can have a better sense of its potential payback.  
Riley (2007) likens technology standards to elements of a competitive strategy in 
which market and firm-specific factors moderate the effectiveness of decisions and 
actions taken in the development of standards.81 This firm’s history of standards 
activities, its assets, the characteristics of the technology in question and the 
characteristics of the market are all influencing factors in the success achieved by the 
firm in pursuing a technology standard. 
- 34 - 
 
An interesting, but often overlooked, point about the willingness and funding of 
personnel for technology standards development activity is raised by Blind (2006) who 
contends that standards work results in the flow of R&D primarily from large, well-
funded and resourced firms to smaller and less-resourced counterparts.82 The 
implication being that industry leaders with high R&D output must be wooed by the 
standards developing ecosystem with favorable licensing terms as incentive to 
counterbalance the net outflow of R&D output from large to small firms. Another 
implication is related to the resource requirements of technology standards 
development. Large firms are more able to afford assigning their talented employees to 
these tasks while the same may be apocryphal for small or medium-sized firms. Thus, 
the latter may be chronically under-represented in influencing the direction of 
technology standards development which may necessitate external policies, such as 
government, to goad these firms into active participation and positive contribution.  
Waguespack and Fleming (2009) examined the role of startup firms in 
technology standards development and found that participation in standards activities 
greatly accelerated a “liquidity event.”83 The surprising finding here is that technology 
adoption, per se, was not the sole benefit for the startup but that simply attending 
standards organization meetings and conferences provided a sufficient level of exposure 
to exert influence, establish relationships with others in the ecosystem, and thus gain 
traction for the startup firm’s technological innovations. This important finding 
highlights the impact of relationships within technology standards developing regimes. 
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Consistent with this finding, Harryson (2008) reports on the importance of relationship 
management for startup firms to balance technological explorations with industrial 
exploitations.84 An implication of this study suggests that by building relationships, R&D 
managers can establish bridges to “previously disconnected disciplines and areas of 
value creating activities to drive creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship.”  
2.2 Multiple Perspectives 
A substantial portion of the academic literature on standards development and 
its association to technological innovation in the ICT industry is organized along various 
perspectives such as Economic, Strategic, Organizational, and Legal (ESOL). These 
perspectives indicate the primary emphases and foci of the scholars. There are ancillary 
streams of inquiry such as innovation management, modularity and so on. Here, I shall 
outline the key findings in the ESOL perspectives. 
2.2.1 Economic 
Farrell and Saloner form a duo of economists with prolific contributions to the 
standards literature. In a seminal study, Farrell and Saloner (1985) examine the 
standardization trap to determine if the process of standards development can confine 
an industry on an obsolete or inferior technology path.85 In a follow-up study (1986), 
these same researchers expound on the network effects of compatibility standards and 
show the effect of established technologies and the incentives for the adoption of 
newer standards-based technologies.86 They posit that in the presence of an installed 
base, the early adopters of a new technology standard bear a disproportionate 
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transition cost. In examining compatibility through converters overlaid on a standard, 
Farrell and Saloner (1992) establish that compatibility is a matter of degree and that a 
degree of compatibility can be achieved ex post at a cost.87 Their findings imply that the 
economic benefit of converters is limited, at best, and the models they proffer are static 
in nature and do not comprehend the issues inherent in a dynamic milieu. Along the 
same stream of enquiry, Simcoe (2003) acknowledges the high-stakes nature of 
standards development in the presence of strong network effects and studies the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to determine the relationship between the 
commercial stakes of the standards process with the length of the decision-making 
process in a standardization committee.88  
In examining the economic and technological significance of standards 
organizations, Rysman and Simcoe (2008) consider patent disclosure distributions and 
find that SSOs play a key role in the adoption of the standards they develop.89 Simcoe 
(2006) further explores the inherent tensions between cooperation and competition in 
the standards creation process and finds that the shift towards an “open innovation” 
model by some technology firms has increased controversy surrounding IPR strategy 
and licensing policy. Simcoe believes that aggressive IPR strategies can reduce the 
expected value of a technology standard.90  
Katz and Shapiro form another duo of economists with copious contributions to 
the standards literature. In a ground-breaking study, Katz and Shapiro (1985a) consider 
R&D rivalry and find that major innovations will not be licensed but that minor 
- 37 - 
 
innovations constitute better candidates for licensing by efficient firms.91 These same 
researchers (1985b) show that the desire for standardization by a firm can vary with its 
position in the market (i.e. its market share).92 In an important subsequent study Katz 
and Shapiro (1986a) analyze technology adoption in industries with strong network 
externalities and find that adoption depends on sponsorship and that sponsors exercise 
great influence on the ecosystem through investments to promote their technologies.93 
In a related study, Katz and Shapiro (1986b) examine the optimal licensing strategy of 
research labs that compete with their licensees and show, inter alia, that a profit-
maximizing strategy is not always in the licensor’s advantage.94 In studying the behavior 
of rival firms in a dynamic setting, Katz and Shapiro (1987) find that the dissemination of 
innovation through licensing is only pursued if the innovation is deemed to be of minor 
value by the innovating firms in order to discourage imitation by its rivals.95 Continuing 
to expound on their network externalities model, Katz and Shapiro (1992) find, counter-
intuitively, that markets exhibit a propensity to rush into new, incompatible 
technologies and that the firm introducing the new technology is biased against 
compatibility as it establishes its own product as the standard.96 In another important 
study, Katz and Shapiro (1994) explore the economics of complementary innovations. 
They highlight the need to further analyze linkages between hardware and software to 
better understand the dynamics of standards adoption in light of the ambiguity over the 
formation of coalitions and the behaviors of standards consortia, and to develop a more 
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sophisticated grasp of incentives for innovation in the face of uncertain technological 
progress.97  
Sherry and Teece (2004) investigate the changing value of patents and find an 
increase in value as patents are infringed upon or lead to litigation.98 This has a direct 
bearing on the desire on the part of ICT firms to participate in SDOs in order to take 
advantage of the available IPR protections. In their investigation of the optimal licensing 
fee structure and model, Kulatilaka and Lin (2006) find the investment threshold to be 
monotonically decreasing in the intensity of network effects and the level of uncertainty 
as the investing firm pursues technology standards.99 Further, Lin and Kulatilaka (2006) 
show the impact of network effects on licensing choice and find that a fixed-fee regime 
is optimal in the presence of strong networks. In other words, with increasing intensity 
of the network externalities, the optimality of licensing shifts from a royalty regime to a 
fee regime.100 Lin (2011) delves deeper into the problem of patent “thickets” and 
mathematically demonstrates the compound effect of patent stacking, where one 
patent depends on another and can lead to excessive royalty burdens for the licensee. 
She shows that patent thickets do not necessarily lead to “double marginalization” but 
depend on the form of license.101  
Grossman and Lai (2004) examine the incentives used by governments to protect 
IPR by considering two hypothetical countries, “north” and “south,” and develop 
economic models to explain the trade-off between increased innovations that result 
from a dynamic policy in an open economy with the competitive pricing of IP that ensue 
- 39 - 
 
from a static policy in a closed economy.102 Their findings confirm that large markets for 
innovative products compel governments to grant strong IP protection, while smaller 
economies have virtually no incentives to grant such protections. Schmalensee (2009) 
and Gilbert (2010) consider the problem of royalty stacking and patent holdup by 
examining policy questions related to participation in standards organizations, and 
concludes that SDOs must conduct ex ante IPR pricing “auction” to determine royalty 
rates before standards are approved.103 104 
An overlooked aspect of standards work is the process through which funding 
and financing are procured for its development. Spring and Weiss (1995) have but 
barely attempted to address this issue through the development of a framework which 
requires further quantitative analysis to yield useful and actionable cost-benefit 
assessment to address the chronic under-provisioning problem faced by most 
technology standards.105  
2.2.2 Strategic 
The landmark study of Teece (1986), addressing the question of the benefactors 
of innovation, underpins an important body of research that informs much of the 
standards literature focused on strategy.106  
Figure 3 below depicts the Teece model: 
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Figure 3 – The Teece "Profiting from Innovation" model. 
Teece points out that when imitation is easy the financial benefits of an 
innovation can accrue to providers of complementary assets rather than to the 
originator of the innovation. The Teece framework maps the market power of 
innovators against the degree of protection of IP appropriability. Teece’s key 
contribution in this regard is the strategic roadmap for innovators and imitators as they 
interact with complementary assets providers to increase the value of the original 
innovation. In a subsequent study, Teece (1998) proffers important models for the 
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optimal exploitation of intangible assets such as knowledge, competence and IP, and 
observes that these assets form the basis of competitive differentiation in many sectors 
of the ICT industry.107  
Many scholars have built on Teece’s landmark findings. For instance Egyedi 
(1996) observes that standardization of technology is an endogenous factor for the firm 
engaged in its development.108 In other words, participation in standards consortia 
enable the firm to be aware of its ecosystem and to react quickly to its feedback loop by 
adjusting internal strategies and resource allocations. This is largely in agreement with 
Schmidt and Werle (1998) who maintain that standardization facilitates and coordinates 
technology development in an orderly and predictable manner within the firm.109 
Jacobides, et al. (2006) extend Teece’s original question of ways to protect innovation 
for reaping maximum benefits, and reshape the argument to one of finding value 
regardless of imitation by proposing structural dynamics of efficiency over control and 
by providing concrete templates for consideration by managers.110  
Tao, et al. (2005) posit a set of strategies to organize intellectual assets to 
facilitate value extraction beyond that created by implementing these assets in 
technology-intensive products and services.111 Pisano (2006) re-examines the notion of 
appropriability and shows that a “tight” regime, that is one with strong IP protection, is 
not advantageous to the firm given the changes in the industry brought about by the 
open source phenomenon.112 Rose, et al. (2007) posits that a properly constructed IP 
policy will benefit the firm and its shareholders by boosting the firm’s stock price.113 
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Egyedi (2010) points to some dysfunctional behaviors in the market that require active 
involvement by the government to mitigate, such as the non-standard use of cell phone 
chargers, which in 2008 alone were estimated at 1.2 billion worldwide, or competing 
standards that seek to accomplish the same result which, without corrective 
intervention by governments, can result in market confusion and sub-optimal user 
experience.114 These failures in standardization can lead to lack of market transparency, 
incompatibility, inefficiency and waste in resource usage, and the dampening of 
innovation. 
Besen and Farrell (1994) analyze the determinants of, and proffer strategies for, 
firms that participate in standards development in a horizontal market model.115 They 
point out that by promoting or preventing the adoption of their preferred technology 
standards firms drastically affect competition and ascribe large benefits for themselves 
by prevailing in the establishment of an “architectural franchise” through which their 
chosen standards gain dominance. Farrell and Simcoe (2012) examines the tradeoffs 
between speed and quality of outcome within formal standards organizations and finds 
that consensus-building in a voluntary organization can lead to war of attrition and 
ultimately to suboptimal outcomes.116 
Updegrove (1995) was among the first to outline the strategic intent behind 
keystone firms’ participation in standards organizations for market advantage, the 
emerging IPR policy issues, as well as the evolutionary trajectory of standards 
organizations into national or international consortia.117 With regard to the strategic 
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investment in technology standards development, Kulatilaka and Lin (2004) consider 
firms with temporary monopoly opportunities and find a tipping point for licensing fees 
that can assure the investing firm an adequate return as well as the coalescence of the 
industry around a single standard, thus avoiding the repercussions of fragmentation that 
can result from multiple and competing standards.118  
Tassey (2000) discusses the effects of standardization on technology innovation 
and diffusion and confirms that US industry and government managers are beginning to 
rethink their laissez faire attitude towards technology standards by realizing that 
standards constitute a form of technical infrastructure and thus have considerable 
public good.119  
Blind and Thumm (2004) explore the relationship between patenting and 
standardization strategies and report, counter-intuitively, that firms with higher patent 
intensity have a lower propensity to join a standards developing organization.120 This 
finding implies that if keystone firms with strong technological base stay away from the 
standardization process then both the quality of the standard and its diffusion will 
suffer.  
Seo (2007) considers the process by which organizations make decisions about 
involvement in standards work by integrating the “Actor Network” and the “Self-
Organized Complexity” theories into a framework for a holistic understanding of this 
decision-making process.121 Seo identifies six fundamental elements for an organization 
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to consider in ICT standardization, one of which is IPR, and confirms that essential IP 
provides a strategic advantage to its holder in this context.  
In addressing the attempts to mitigate patent holdups, to force the disclosure of 
essential patents by their holders prior to the adoption of a standard, and to amend 
RAND terms with proportionality and maximum rents, Geradin (2006) argues that these 
measure ossify bilateral negotiations between patent owners and their implementers, 
constrain the licensing strategies of firms with large IP portfolios, create delays in the 
implementation of technological innovations, and lead to flawed mechanisms in 
allocating royalties among owners and users of IP.122 
With a perspective on the impact of globalization on business competition, Basu 
and Waymire (2008) show that intangible assets such as ideas and knowledge 
embedded in patents and other forms of IP have taken on dramatic importance as value 
drivers of business in developed economies.123 They contend that these intangible are a 
potential source of revenue but that few companies actually report stand-alone 
valuation of these assets due to challenges in current accounting practices.  
In recognizing the great disparity in technology standardization and IPR policy 
setting between the West and the emerging markets elsewhere in the world, DeNardis 
(2009) argues for greater openness in ICT standards development through government 
procurement policies and corporate strategies.124  
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2.2.3 Organizational  
The standardization of technology implies an agreement to do certain things in 
an open, prescribed and uniform manner, in contrast to a closed environment. Farrell, 
Monroe and Saloner (1998) confirm that firms prefer closed vertical organization to 
open vertical organization even though the latter may be socially more desirable.125 
Farrell and Saloner (1988) consider the question of coordination within committees of 
standards organizations and find that committees are by and large efficient means of 
coordination in standards development.126  
Nelson, Shaw and Qualls (2005) find that industrial groups increasingly leverage 
the use of non-profit, voluntary-consensus standards development consortia to 
proliferate technology standards.127 These researchers propose a model that that 
disaggregates technology standards development into six distinct activities.  
Regazzoni and Rizzi (2011) introduce organization structures for the autonomous 
management of IP portfolios.128  Using the TRIZ methodology, these researchers seek to 
map out the process of IP creation and look for sensitivities and optimization points in 
the overall creative process of IP generation. By studying patents in this way, 
organizations can examine patterns and continuously look for innovation possibilities 
through incremental optimizations in processes and organizations.  
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) demonstrate that innovation teams can efficiently 
interact with outsiders, such as standards development organizations, and discuss the 
nature of the external activities and their link to the organizations overall 
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performance.129 Rindova, Petkova and Kotha (2007) discuss the continuous morphing of 
organizational structures to remain competitive in fast-moving environments and draw 
parallels to technology standards organizations.130 Lichtenhaler (2008) shows how 
absorptive and desorptive capacity can be used to transfer technology across 
organizational boundaries with implications for technology standards bodies.131 132 
2.2.4 Legal 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) examine patenting behavior of the top 100  
semiconductor firms during the “pro-patent” shift in the United States legal 
environment and find, paradoxically, a dramatic rise in patenting of intellectual assets 
among semiconductor firms that are historically not known for reaping returns on R&D 
investments through patenting.133 Lemley (2002) provides a comprehensive survey of 
the legal aspects of technology standardization vis-a-vis the law and outlines four basic 
tenets: 1-the practical uses of IP and the rules that govern such use, 2-the organic 
diversity among standards organizations in the way they treat IPR, 3-the restrictive 
nature of age-old antitrust rules in a dynamic environment such as technology 
standardization, and 4-the role standards organizations play in ameliorating overlapping 
policies in multiple industries.134 Related to this research, Gibson (2007) highlights the 
issues of the proper disclosure of IPR and the clear declarations concerning licensing of 
these assets as major impediments to the internationalization of technology 
standards.135  
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In a seminal study Reitzig (2004) outlines recent trends in the use of patents and 
the rise of thickets as an IP strategy adopted by ICT firms. Essentially, thickets are 
formed when several patents are bulked that may be separable into individual rights but 
cannot exclusively be assigned to an economic unit. Reitzig makes an important 
distinction in the way patents can be used as strategic leverage between discrete and 
complex technologies.136 Simcoe, Graham and Feldman (2009) examine the use of IP by 
small and large firms within standards organizations and find that for small firms the 
probability of filing a lawsuit increases after the disclosure of essential IP, while the rate 
is unchanged for larger firms. Thus, standardization increases the difference in litigious 
behavior between small and large innovative firms because smaller firms cannot seek 
rents in complementary markets in which larger firms participate.137  
From a policy perspective, the government ought to exercise extreme reluctance 
to intervene or influence the direction of technology standards development and IPR 
policies. This is the view advanced by Baird (2007) in affirming that the ICT industry is 
sufficiently sophisticated in regard to standards setting. The U.S. government has a long 
historical preference for market independence, international trade agreements limit the 
role of government in free enterprise markets, and the ability of governments to stay 
informed and to make correct decisions at crucial junctures in technology lifecycle is 
severely constrained.138 Baird’s advice is for government to encourage market solutions 
through incentives where possible and only intervene where a mandatory technology 
standard would provide substantial benefit through the minimization of deviations from 
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market norms and the provision of flexible and efficient processes for the revision of 
standards to account for technological innovation and evolution. This view is somewhat 
countered by Bird (2006) who claims that the U. S. government is showing strong 
interest in protecting IP in developing economies, particularly in Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (collectively called BRIC).139 China, in particular, is taking a renewed interest in 
setting national policy on the development of standards and IP.140 141 142 
Commenting on the growing importance of IP assets in high-growth industries 
such as software and electronics, Wang (2010) cites Rivette and Kline in observing that 
IP law has transformed from dormancy to the driving engine of growth in high-
technology companies.143 Wang stresses, again citing Rivette and Kline that it is a “rare 
company … that has any clue whatsoever about how to value, analyze, and structure … 
IP asset transfers.”  
The weight and magnitude of standards setting in a modern, knowledge-based 
economy, according to Layne-Farrar (2010) comes into focus when considering the 
crucial role of IPR in setting standards.144 In particular, the author discusses the 
disaggregation of the technology industry into design, manufacturing and testing that is 
scattered across the globe and is ever more reliant on technology standards as well as 
the role of non-practicing entities with large patent portfolios who adopt an offensive IP 
licensing strategy. The author cites the case of eBay v. MercExchange where the 
concurring opinions of Supreme Court Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter and Breyer 
held “…An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis of 
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production and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. …For 
those firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”145 146  
In confirming the dynamic capabilities and the Shumpeterian notion of 
innovation-based competition advanced by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997)147 and the 
sustainable competitive advantage made possible through the resource-based view of 
the firm first advanced by Barney (1991), Bagley (2008) argues that technology 
managers must remain astute to the provision of the law to create and capture value for 
the firm, including its intellectual assets.148 Sagers (2010) cautions technology managers 
to be aware of antitrust regulations and the liabilities of SDO participation when 
standardizing technologies.149 Anton and Yao (1995) provide further insight on these 
issues. Courts are likely to find antitrust liability where there are exclusionary provisions 
or egregious processes, particularly when those exclusions or processes are not 
germane to the development of the standard itself.150  
Rai (1999) points out that the issues of IPR in technology research is not limited 
to the ownership of intellectual assets but also extends to social norms that govern 
claims of ownership. In general, the evolution of law is outpaced by rapid technological 
change, legal rules for the application of IPR policy sweep broadly and thus may be 
inefficient in doing so, and legal professionals do not always have adequate access to 
relevant information pertaining to technological change.151  
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Finally, in studying the determinants of essential patent claims, that is those 
patents that are deemed indispensable for designing and manufacturing products, 
Bekkers, Bongard and Nuvolari (2011) empirically establish that the content of the 
claims and the involvement of the claimant in the standardization process itself are de 
rigueur in the eventual success of the standard.152  
2.3 Summary of the Mainstream Literature 
From the preceding survey of the academic literature on technology standards, it 
can be surmised that keystone firms influence the direction and pace of technology 
innovations through the development of standards (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002), that 
technology standards development requires significant investment with high risk of 
inadequate returns and is not always a rational choice (Kulitalaka and Lin, 2004), and 
that the adoption and diffusion of technology standards is dependent on and facilitated 
through network externalities, complementary innovations and market timing (Schilling, 
2002). These findings are further buttressed by Gandal (2002).153 Further, it can be seen 
that standards-based innovation creates interdependence between firms and facilitates 
the pooling of intellectual assets, that complementarity and network effects of 
ecosystems is necessary for success of the standardization effort, and that the legal and 
regulatory environment for collaboration in SDOs is dynamic and ever-changing. 
The key themes that emerge from the review of the mainstream literature on 
technology standardization are: 
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1. The optimal exploitation of intellectual assets such as knowledge, competence and 
IP by the ICT firm to differentiate itself from its competitors; 
2. The influence wielded by keystone firms in setting the direction and pace of 
technology innovation through the development of technology standards; 
3. The timely facilitation of technology diffusion and the enabling of its adoption 
through network externalities and ecosystems associated with SDOs; and 
4. The requirements for significant investments for the development of technology 
standards with high risk of inadequate returns. 
There are several peripheral streams of inquiry that are inter-related to the 
mainstream literature on technology standardization and are mentioned below for 
completeness. 
2.4 Auxiliary Streams of Inquiry 
In the context of New Product Development (NPD), a large portion of the 
literature on standardization in the ICT industry covers compatibility standards. Sahay 
and Riley (2003) provide additional perspective by addressing customer interface 
standards.154 These researchers show that appropriability regimes have different 
impacts on the pursuit of customer interface and compatibility standards. There exists a 
considerable body of literature that highlights the advancements and shortcomings of 
the notion of modularity and reuse in various technology-based product design and 
development. Many research streams are directly or indirectly related to technology 
standardization. In particular, there exists a rich set of literature on product innovation 
- 52 - 
 
and modular architecture, some of which is included below. Other bodies of scholarly 
work use game theory to probe into inter-organizational collaborations on SDOs. Some 
of this research is built on the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm where the 
participating organization’s economic and human resources and strategic capabilities 
are found to be crucial in its ability to participate in technology standardization. 
2.4.1 Innovation Management 
In a seminal paper, Henderson and Clark (1990) point out that the traditional 
bifurcation of technology innovation as either ‘incremental’ or ‘radical’ is incomplete 
and potentially misleading.155 They methodically distinguish between the components 
of a product and the ways in which innovations are integrated into that product through 
platform architectures and standardized interface points. 
Iansiti and Richards (2006) show that technology-intensive industries are 
organized as complex and dynamic networks of suppliers, customers, competitors, 
assimilators, and value-added resellers.156 Firms in these networks often take on one or 
more of these roles at any given time, thus adding to the complexities of collaboration 
and communication. Iansiti and Levien (2004) document the phenomenon of the 
clustering of technology-based firms into business ecosystems and the roles and 
functions discharged by the leader of this coagulation (also called “keystone”).157 The 
relationships between firms in an ecosystem often change or morph in unanticipated 
ways. A supplier one day can be an assimilator the next and so on. The integrative 
model that captures these complex relationships is articulated by Porter (1983).158 159 
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Porter’s “five forces” model has been further extended by Burgelman (2002)160 and is 
used by business strategy consultants for the cogency by which it establishes one 
central tenant: the interdependence of firms in an ecosystem. This interdependency is 
bidirectional and equally applicable to the keystone as it is to the other firms that 
belong to the network.  
Sawhney and Prandelli (2000) explain the phenomenon of distributed 
innovation, whereby firms in an ecosystem—ranging from competitors to 
complementors—pool their resources to collaboratively develop and sustain technology 
innovation, including standards, for the benefit of their ecosystems.161 By using the 
multiplicative benefits inherent in a business ecosystem, technology firms can justify 
continued investments for sustained technology innovation and value-added 
differentiation. Sawhney and Prandelli have established that for technology-intensive 
firms, cooperation and co-dependence are more attractive alternatives to self-reliance, 
as market and economic pressures drive firms to constrict their knowledge base, 
maximize their expertise and streamline their operations around a band of core 
competencies.  
Chesbrough (2003) is among the first to identify “open innovation” as a trend 
among technology-intensive firms where those firms that cannot afford to invest on 
their own innovate by licensing or buying intellectual assets from other firms.162 Hamel 
and Prahalad (2005) further highlight a trend where some technology firms beat out 
their competition through collaboration with a network of complementors.163 Ernst 
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(2005), in confirming Pavitt’s (1999) argument on the link between complex innovations, 
such as chip design, and the internationalization of semiconductor manufacturing, 
discovers that the methodological changes intended to improve chip production instead 
yield increased cognitive and organizational complexity such that some products require 
a large number of designers with specialized and diverse capabilities. He further 
establishes that geographic proximity can become a disadvantage by empirically 
confirming the Granstrand, et al. (1993) and Cantwell (1995) suggestions that the 
“centrifugal” forces of geographical decentralization are stronger than the “centripetal” 
forces of geographic centralization that link multiple, dispersed innovation centers.164  
Technology standards development facilitates inter-firm collaboration by 
providing well-understood interface points. Commenting on the emerging modular 
market structure in the technology industry, Iansiti (2005) posits that “the days of the 
lone wolf are over,” and “standing alone is no longer a viable business model.”165 
2.4.2 Modularity 
Modular product design has ushered in a continuous stream of innovations 
around common product platforms and architectures that enhance product variety and 
mass customization capability, enable rapid upgradability to meet changing market 
needs, provide for economies of scale and scope, increase the pace of parallel 
development, improve product design flexibility while decreasing development costs, 
facilitate shorter product development times and allow for efficient recombination of 
resources to achieve corporate strategies. 
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Modularity—the technique that enables the disaggregation of a monolithic 
structure into discrete and atomic parts, one or more of which can be juxtaposed to 
form a variety of products based upon a common, standardized architecture using 
known interface points, which can be scaled along several axes such as functionality, 
reliability, price, etcetera, to satisfy varying usage models and market needs—is an 
intrinsic byproduct of technology standards development. Ulrich (1995) defines 
modularity as “the relative property of a product’s architecture.” 166 For Ulrich, the 
physical elements that comprise a product are chunked along functional components 
that implement one or more functions in their entirety and the inter-chunk interactions 
are well-defined along interface points. Further, Ulrich sees modular product 
architecture as one that “…includes a one-to-one mapping from functional elements in 
the function in structure to the physical components of the products.”  
Baldwin and Clark (1997) define modularity as “building a complex product or 
process from smaller subsystems that can be designed independently yet function 
together as a whole.”167 In adapting McClelland and Rumelhart (1995), Baldwin and 
Clark (2000) further state that “…a module is a unit whose structural elements are 
powerfully connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements 
in other units. Clearly there are degrees of connection, thus there are gradations of 
modularity.”168 The Baldwin and Clark definition of modularity is premised on the 
relationship between structures and not on functions, while Ulrich emphasizes the 
functional characteristics of the structural modules.  
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Product architecture enables the systematic and predictable proliferation of a 
family of products that are sourced from a common set of well-known interface points, 
components, parts and other technology building blocks. Zwernik, et al. (2007) consider 
product architecture as “a translation of functional requirements into physical 
definitions of building blocks.”169 In a sense, product architecture facilitates the 
methodical and the procedural development of technology-intensive products by 
bringing together experiential knowledge and techniques with the theoretical 
underpinnings of proven methodologies to create a common base of technologies, or a 
platform, which can shorten development time, enhance design quality and enable the 
firm to meet a broad range of customer preferences and needs. The iPod from Apple is a 
recent example of a well-architected product platform. The Apple iPod classic, iPod 
nano, iPod shuffle and iPod touch, to name a few, constitute different models of a 
product family, all of which are constructed from a common platform and modules, with 
each member of the product family having a variable range of capabilities and functions. 
Ulrich and Eppinger (2008) documented the concept of product architecture and 
consider a technology-based product to be comprised of functional and physical 
elements. The former are the operations associated with the product, while the latter 
are the parts, components and assemblies that implement the product’s functions.170 
Ulrich (1995) bifurcates product architecture into “modular” and “integral” types and 
stratifies modular architecture into “slot,” “bus” or “sectional” typology.171 According to 
Ulrich, a modular architecture includes “a one-to-one mapping from functional 
- 57 - 
 
elements in the function structure to the physical components of the product, and 
specifies de-coupled interfaces between components.” An integral architecture, on the 
other hand, includes “a complex, non-one-to-one, mapping from functional elements to 
physical components and/or coupled interfaces between components.” The automobile 
radio is an example of slot modularity, while the addition of an expansion card in a 
personal computer is deemed as bus modularity, and office partitions and piping typify 
sectional modularity.  
In whatever form, modular architectures facilitate product change, enable 
product variety, increase component standardization, and reduce product development 
time. The so-called “delayed differentiation” of a product, according to Ulrich and 
Eppinger (2008), is a key benefit of a modular architecture that allows decisions to be 
deferred about localization or customization of products to maximize appeal to 
customers and to enlarge the total available market.172 Technology innovation through 
modular design principles is possible only if there are standards that clearly define 
interface points and provide agreed-upon interoperability guidelines. 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the concept of modularity in 
technology-based product design took on added importance, especially in the 
development of automotive,173 aircrafts,174 household appliances,175 IT and enterprise 
computers and computing solutions,176 177 178 179 180 181 as well as other technology-
based industries. 182 183 184 185 186 187 
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Studies have shown the manner in which modularity can influence market 
evolution and induce product proliferation through rivalry and competition. Modularity 
leads to products that can be systematically upgraded to meet evolving customer needs 
that modular product development positively impacts the innovation capabilities of the 
and that modularity hastens organizational learning through concentration on a few set 
of interface points and well-defined modules.188 189 The counter-argument, put forth by 
Chesbrough and Kusunoki (2001), posits that focused learning can lead to a myopic 
viewpoint which in turn can engender a loss of focus on the broader learning and 
innovation opportunities that could otherwise be available.190 Greater degrees of design 
modularity and higher levels of IT infrastructure flexibility enhance the operational 
performance of the firm through optimized supply chain responsiveness.191 In this vein, 
modularity is attributed to the co-evolution of vertical outsourcing and horizontal 
consolidation in electronics manufacturing and the rise of the contract manufacturing 
industry.192 193 
To recap, modular designs facilitate the outsourcing of non-critical components 
through network alliances, thereby resulting in the efficient operation of the firm 
through focus on higher priority activities.194 Modular designs allow large conglomerates 
to obtain operational dexterity in responding to dynamic market changes by 
recombining resources to maintain their market presence and competitiveness.195 There 
are multiple linkages between product architecture and industry structure, and these 
linkages explain the observed intra-industry heterogeneity across firms.196 197 The 
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reduction in the volume of information and the amount of knowledge sharing made 
possible through the codification of standardized design rules allows the firm to pursue 
outsourcing strategies within its ecosystem. 198 199 200 201 
2.5 Summary of Research Streams  
The literature referenced above describes how standards-based product 
architecture benefits the firm and positions it for market success through the rapid 
proliferation of innovative products made possible by open standards. Technology 
standards facilitate revenue opportunities for firms that invest in innovations which end 
up in open standards and thus grant the innovating firm the opportunity to derive 
revenues from the licensing of its intellectual assets. Licensing terms depend on the 
marginal costs prevalent in upstream and downstream markets. The literature on 
technology standards affirms that upstream firms in the ICT industry do not experience 
high marginal costs but that downstream firms can run into a variety of problems such 
as ambushes and thickets. Much of this research employs economic theories to describe 
various stimuli that engender standards development in the ICT industry. Table 6 below 
shows a non-exhaustive selection of the research streams already discussed: 
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Table 6 – Select research streams in the academic literature (non-exhaustive). 
Author(s) Title Focus Perspective 
David, 
Greenstein 
Economics of compatibility 
standards 
Broad survey of literature on technology 
standardization 
Economic 
Cohen, 
Goto, et al 
R&D spillovers and incentives 
to innovate 
Patent sharing (intra-industry R&D 
knowledge) more in Japan than US; 
patents used for negotiation in Japan 
Tassey 
Standardization in 
technology-based markets 
Effects of standardization on technology 
innovation and diffusion 
Spring, 
Weiss 
Financing the standards 
development process 
Framework for examining the financing of 
technology standards development 
Lin, 
Kulatilaka 
Network effects and tech 
licensing w/ fixed fee 
Impact of network effects on licensing 
choice; fixed fee found to be optimal in 
strong networks 
Kulatilaka 
Investment in technology 
standardization 
Optimal licensing fee and investment 
threshold 
Farrell, 
Saloner 
Standardization, compatibility 
and innovation 
Can standards trap firms into becoming 
inferior 
Gandal 
Compatibility, standardization 
& network effects 
Economics of compatibility and 
standardization is mainstream 
Gans, Sterns 
Incumbency and R&D 
incentives 
Threat to engage in imitative R&D 
increases leverage, incumbents research 
more than entrants 
Gruber, 
Verboven 
Evolution of markets under 
entry and standards 
Effect of government policies on evolution 
of an industry; single standards 
accelerates technology adoption 
Teece, 
Pisano, 
Shuen 
Dynamic capabilities and 
strategic management 
Sources and methods of wealth creation; 
wealth not created by blocking 
competitors 
Besen, 
Farrell 
Choosing how to compete: 
strategies and tactics in 
standardization 
Strategy to compete within a standard vs. 
competing between standards 
Strategic 
Hax, Wilde 
Delta model: adaptive 
management for a changing 
world 
Triangle: three strategic options (low cost, 
differentiation, lock-in) 
Szykman, et 
al 
A foundation for 
interoperability in next-gen … 
Enhanced interoperability for backwards 
and future product development 
Clark 
Interaction of design 
hierarchies and market  
Nature of technology evolution impacts 
dynamics of competition and 
management of innovation 
Krogh, 
Cusumano 
Three strategies for managing 
fast growth 
The key to healthy corporate life is steady 
growth; scaling, duplication, granulation 
Cusumano 
How Microsoft makes large 
teams work like small teams 
How smaller teams can be more effective 
than larger teams in product innovation 
Porter Strategy and the internet 
Importance of companies to differentiate 
through strategy; internet is only an 
enabling strategy 
Harrigan 
Joint ventures and 
competitive strategy 
Impact of particular industry traits upon 
firms' options in pursuing them 
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Dosi 
Technological paradigms and 
technology trajectories 
Continuous changes and discontinuities in 
technological innovation 
Schilling 
Technology success and 
failure in winner-take-all 
Technology standards driven by network 
externalities AND the firm's learning and 
market timing 
Teece 
Profiting from technological 
innovation 
Innovative firms often do not benefit from 
innovation due to strategy, licensing and 
public policy 
Simcoe, 
Graham, 
Feldman 
Competing on standards? IP strategies for small and large firms 
Chellappa, 
Shivendu 
Economic implications of 
variable tech standards 
Analytical model to study implications of 
maintaining different/incompatible 
technology standards 
Hemphill 
Firm patent strategies in US 
technology standards 
development 
Firm patent strategy matrix 
Soh 
Network patterns and 
competitive advantage … 
Central firms w/ high ego density and 
willingness to share knowledge achieved 
better innovation 
Ancona, 
Caldwell 
Bridging the boundary: 
external process and 
performance 
How teams interact with outsiders; nature 
of external activities and link to 
performance 
Org 
Lichtenhaler 
Technology transfer across 
org boundaries 
Absorptive and desorptive capacity 
Zhu, et al. 
Migration to open-standard 
inter-organizations 
Migration from proprietary to open 
standards across organizational 
boundaries 
Hirtz, Stone, 
et al. 
Functional basis for 
engineering design 
Integrates research from NIST and 
universities 
Farrell, 
Monroe, 
Saloner 
The vertical organization of 
industry 
Preferences of firms for closed vertical 
standards setting organizations 
Farrell, 
Saloner 
Coordination through 
committees and markets 
Coordination within committees of 
standards setting organizations 
Nelson, 
Shaw, Qualls 
Interorganizational  system 
standards development 
Industrial groups leveraging the use of 
non-profit, voluntary-consensus standards 
development consortia 
Regazzoni, 
Rizzi 
A TRIZ based approach to 
manage innovation and 
intellectual property … 
Organizational structures for the 
autonomous management of IP 
Bekkers, 
Duysters, 
Verspagen 
Intellectual property rights, 
strategic tech… 
Investigates the role of IP rights in shaping 
the GSM standard 
Legal Simcoe 
Open standards and 
intellectual property rights 
Investigates the inherent tensions 
between cooperation and competition 
Funk, Methe 
Market- and committee based 
mechanisms in 
standardization 
Influence of governments on creation of 
standards-based products 
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Hall, 
Ziedonis 
The patent paradox revisited: 
an empirical study of patents 
in the ICT industry 
Examines patenting behavior of the top 
100 semiconductor firms during the “pro 
patent” shift in the US legal environment 
Lemley 
Intellectual property rights 
and standards setting 
organizations 
Comprehensive survey of the legal aspects 
of technology standardization vis-à-vis the 
law 
Gibson 
Globalization and the 
technology standards game 
Disclosure of IPR and declarations 
concerning licensing of patents as 
impediments to international 
standardization 
Reitzig 
The private value of thickets 
and fences 
Recent trends in the use of patents and 
the rise of thickets  
Baird 
Government at the standards 
bazaar 
Analytical framework for government 
involvement in technology standards 
Wang 
Rise of the patent 
intermediaries 
IP law transformation from dormancy to 
the driving engine of growth in high-
technology firms 
Layne-Farrar 
Business models and the 
standards setting process 
Role of IPR in defining technology 
standards 
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Chapter 3: Research Gaps and Questions  
From the thoroughgoing review of the academic literature, I have identified 
several gaps that will be discussed in this section and linked to the research question 
that lies at the core of my research. 
3.1 Gaps in the Academic Literature 
The most prominent deliberation in the literature on innovation and technology 
standardization can be traced to Teece (1986) and his “profiting from innovation” model 
which boils down to the following question: should technological innovations that are 
subsumed in standards be licensed and for how much, or should these innovations be 
given away as open standards to engender broad adoption by the industry, even by 
competitors? Some scholars such as Kulitalika and Lin (2004, 2006) have proposed 
mathematical models to optimize licensing fees for the innovating firm, while other 
scholars such as Katz and Shapiro (1985), Leibowitz and Margolis (1994) and Shapiro and 
Varian (1999) believe that network effects alone can accrue sufficient value and utility 
from the use of standards for both the investing firm as well as the consumer of such 
goods.  
Pisano (2006) highlights a major gap in the Teece model whose formulation 
takes for granted an IPR appropriability regime that is determined exogenously to the 
firm. Pisano points out that this formulation misses the shift to endogenous regimes 
where the behavior of the firm can significantly vitiate or bolster its IPR appropriability 
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and the total value of its innovation through complementary assets. Simcoe (2005) 
echoes Teece when he debates the tension between value creation and value capture 
inherent in the creation of technology standards.202  
David and Greenstein (1990) discuss two distinct themes that reflect the robust 
debate on the economic issues in the mainstream standards literature. To wit, 
competition among products that adopt differing standards engenders interoperability 
and compatibility problems for the consumer, and results in inventory proliferation for 
the firm. Also, ICT firms are faced with intense pressures to make their product 
compatible with rival offerings in order to provide choice and variety. The upshot of 
these trends puts downward pressure on innovation and the spillover effect negatively 
impacts recoupment of R&D investments. Soh (2010) has shown that ICT firms that 
exhibit transparent intent and flexibility in adopting and promoting product 
compatibility stand a better chance of market success.203 
Aside from Gawer and Cusumano (2002), there is little attention paid to firms’ 
incentives to provide resources to advance the work of standards organizations, and 
even less work has been done to probe the manner in which technologies are selected 
to be standardized by these organizations. Lemley (2002) and Gibson (2007) point out a 
major gap in the rules governing IPR disclosure and licensing in a sweeping survey of 
forty-plus standards organizations. While the heterogeneity in these IPR rules are a 
recognized gap that have been the topic of studies by other scholars, including the 
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ambiguous definitions for the various licensing regimes, the issue of IP valuation is not 
adequately addressed.  
Other streams of inquiry expose the debates on the merits and pitfalls of SDO 
formation. These consortia provide a counterweight to large keystone firms with 
significant market power, such as Microsoft (Hawkins, 1999); however, cooperation 
among large firms on defining standards can give rise to collusion and run afoul of 
antitrust laws. Most scholars are agreed that when it comes to evaluating IP for 
monetary value or for deciding whether to contribute IP to facilitate downstream 
business opportunity, the literature and research-based models are sparse. These 
scholars include Cerqueti and Ventura (2009), Vickers (2009), Langlois (1999), Pitkethly 
(1997), and others.204 205 206 207 Given the richness of the literature surrounding 
technology standards, the most germane gaps pertaining to my research question are 
summarized in Table 7 below: 
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Table 7 - Gaps in the academic literature. 
Research Theme Findings Gaps 
Optimal 
exploitation of 
intellectual assets 
(knowledge, 
patents, etc.) 
Technology standards development 
requires simultaneous coordination 
across several stages of innovation and 
production 
Model to assess risks and benefits of 
investments in IP development and 
contribution to technology standards 
Influence on the 
direction and pace 
of technology 
innovation 
Keystone firms set standardization 
agenda and create ecosystems to drive 
innovations, despite the necessity to 
share IP with rivals 
Key determinants of the decision to 
participate in organizations that 
define technology standards 
Facilitation of 
technology 
standards adoption 
through ecosystems 
There is no uniform model to link 
technological innovation and the 
development of IP to the 
standardization these innovations 
Holistic framework through which 
ICT firms assess various perspectives 
before joining standards 
organizations 
Significant 
investments with 
high risk of 
inadequate returns 
IPR policies of various SDOs are non-
uniform, creating confusion in the ICT 
industry over technology standards 
development and adoption 
Risk mitigation and investment 
recoupment considerations in the 
decision to join standardization 
effort 
 
3.2 Research Objective 
There are no extant decision support models or frameworks to help technology 
managers in assessing the relevant criteria in the decision to join or not join a 
technology standardization effort. For instance, what factors are relevant? How should 
these factors be prioritized and weighted in the decision? Are there different sets of 
factors depending on the technology, the standards organization, the market segment, 
and other such considerations? Is there a holistic framework by which managers in ICT 
firms can assess competing perspectives and other germane considerations in such a 
decision? How do these managers quantify benefits and mitigate risks? Most technology 
managers operate with insufficient information and analysis in this regard. 
In addition, technology managers have no deterministic way to judge whether a 
product-focused or royalty-focused strategy will better serve the firm in harvesting 
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value from its IP portfolio. Nor are there any studies to show whether an ex ante or ex 
post arrangement serves as the optimum IPR policy for a standards organization. In fact, 
the esoteric and variant nature of IPR contracts in different SDOs is flaccid in the view of 
most technology managers.  
Thus, the paramount objective of this research is to develop and validate a 
model to assist technology managers in deciding whether or not to participate in the 
standardization of their innovative technologies, taking into account the important 
decision criteria with a diligent appraisal of all available alternatives and outcomes.  
This research framework is depicted in Figure 4 with the gaps previously outlined 
in Table 7 above: 
 
Figure 4 - Research framework. 
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3.3 Perspectives Derived From the Literature 
Ab initio, four distinct perspectives emerge from the review of the academic 
literature on technology standardization. These perspectives are depicted in Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5 - Perspectives gleaned from the academic literature. 
The application of multiple perspectives in managerial decision-making is well 
established in academia.208 Thus, the derivation of the Economic-Strategic-
Organizational-Legal (ESOL) perspectives is the initial unique contribution from my 
research and will be referenced as the ESOL framework throughout this study. 
3.4 Research Question 
The dissimilarity of IPR regimes in SDOs and the dependence of ICT products on a 
growing number of technology standards are formidable challenges faced by firms 
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whose products contain inventions couched in numerous technologies that span 
multiple standards. In such an environment, how should a firm evaluate its IP portfolio 
to determine whether or not to participate in the development and diffusion of 
technology standards? How does a firm know that it has arrived at optimal licensing 
terms for harvesting maximum value from its IP portfolio? What is the strategic 
framework that informs a firm’s IPR policies? What are the impacts of the firm’s IPR 
policies on investments in innovation? I intend to research these and related questions.  
To explore this space, the following question is germane: How does a firm decide 
whether or not to participate in standards development, and thereby to commit its IP 
portfolio to licensing obligations? There are a number of related questions that flow 
from this query. For example, how is an IP portfolio valued and monetized? In other 
words, how much is a given piece of IP worth and how is that value determined?  
My research question constitutes a qualitative assessment of the factors deemed 
essential within a strategic decision-support framework.  
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology  
From the literature-based gap analysis above, it is clear that ICT firms are faced 
with formidable decisions related to the management of innovations and the 
standardization of technologies such as whether the firm should participate in the 
definition or adoption of a technology standard by joining a SDO. Invariably such 
decisions are made in the face of imperfect information and uncertainties, and are 
impacted by a variety of criteria that require precise and up-to-date analysis as well as 
astute managerial experience and judgment.  
4.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) 
Complex managerial decisions have many interrelated components. These form 
a network of interacting factors that necessitate the synthesis of diverse sets of data 
and information. In such a context, it becomes difficult to differentiate causes and 
effects and the decision is often taken in the face of risks and uncertainties.209 The 
central question addressed by this study pertains to strategic decision making in a 
complex, multivariate environment with uncertainty and risk. There are many methods 
that use numeric techniques to differentiate and distinguish among a discrete set of 
alternatives and outcomes.210 211 212 Usually, this is done through the assessment of the 
impact of various interacting criteria in the presence of several decision choices. 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one methodology used by decision 
analysts and managers in multi-criteria decisions. It has been used extensively for over 
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30 years in a variety of managerial decision-making applications and has been found to 
be robust, reliable and flexible.213 214 215 
The premise behind the AHP is simple: a decision maker is faced with a number 
of alternatives and a set of criteria by which to assess each alternative to achieve a 
desired objective.216 AHP disaggregates a decision into a hierarchy and enables the use 
of ratio scales in mathematically-grounded structures to assess the decision.217 The 
outcome with the highest aggregated weight is evaluated for optimality. 
AHP provides a structured approach for making decisions based on scores and 
weights from a multicriteria scoring model. It incorporates the three principles inherent 
in problem solving: decomposition, comparative judgments and synthesis of 
priorities.218 AHP hierarchically decomposes the decision such that the factors or criteria 
can be compared in a pairwise manner against all possible outcomes. In many cases, 
experts provide the necessary matrices of comparison data, which are then 
mathematically transformed into a normalized eigenvector of weights associated with 
each element in the comparison matrix.219 
AHP is a consistent, intuitive and time-tested framework for formulating and 
analyzing multicriteria decisions and within many contexts and applications.220 221 222 For 
this research, the model and dataset availability are well aligned with the disaggregation 
of the decision framework and the quantification of expert judgments, respectively. 
Thus AHP is a suitable research methodology in this case. A disadvantage to the AHP 
methodology is its reliance on human choice and judgments that can be prone to 
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reversals and inconsistencies, especially when experts are asked to re-evaluate their 
preferences after the initial elicitation of pairwise data.223 There is a substantial body of 
research by many scholars, including Tversky, Kahneman and others, that delves into 
the issue of preference reversal.224 225 226 Preference reversal will not be an issue in this 
research as the experts will not be asked to reconsider their original elicitations. 
Other quantitative methodologies include descriptive statistics, Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), other mathematical programming techniques such as 
integer linear or integer non-linear, fuzzy set theory and a number of other 
methodologies.227 228 229 230 231 232 DEA is primarily used to assess the relative efficiency 
of an associated set of Decision Making Units (DMUs). Mathematical programming is 
used extensively in modeling and solving a variety of optimization problems. Fuzzy set 
theory is an extension of set theory that is used chiefly to assess members of a set. 
Some scholars combine multiple methodologies. For example, AHP and DEA can be 
combined in decision support frameworks to overcome information loss or model 
insensitivities.233 234 235 236 237 In this study, I intend to use AHP alone since information 
loss will not be an issue. The resultant model will be rigorously analyzed for consistency. 
4.2 Model Definition 
AHP requires the setting of a goal and the enumeration of the alternative ways 
to achieve that goal. The criteria and sub-criteria for the decision are identified. The 
decision variables are arranged in a hierarchy and the priorities of each alternative are 
determined with respect to the decision criteria and all sub-criteria within the hierarchy.  
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The hierarchy is comprised of the priority matrix linking each decision criterion 
to the goal as well as the priority matrix linking each decision criterion to each 
alternative outcome.238 Data is derived from a variety of sources including data bases, 
expert opinions, literature reviews, and so on. After the data computation has passed 
checks for transitivity and consistency, global weights are assigned to each alternative to 
determine its rank in the decision hierarchy.  
The AHP scoring model is based on the intensity of importance and ranges 
between 1 and 9, with 1 indicating that both options have equal importance, and 9 
signifying that one option is extremely more important than the other.239  
A derivative of AHP called the Hierarchical Decision Modeling (HDM) is employed 
for this study in which the constant-sum method of spreading 100 points in the pairwise 
comparison comprises the main difference with the AHP scoring scale. The relative 
weight assignments of the compared elements derived through the HDM computation 
algorithm is similar to the priority vector of the principal eigenvalues in AHP. Also, HDM 
mitigates for disagreements and inconsistencies, thus removing one of the known issues 
with AHP-based methods termed Condition of Order Preservation (COP).240 
The AHP steps are followed sequentially as depicted in Table 8 below:241  
Table 8 – AHP steps and actions. 
Step Action 
AHP Step 0 
Disaggregate the problem and build a hierarchy of the decision objective, criteria, 
alternatives and other factors germane to the decision 
AHP Step 1 Create pairwise comparison matrices for each decision alternative per criterion 
AHP Step 2 Normalize the matrices of pairwise comparison data 
AHP Step 3 Compute the consistency index, ratio, eigenvector and related statistics 
AHP Step 4 Compute weighted average scores for each decision alternative 
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Chapter 5: Research Design  
A complex managerial decision process typically involves the identification of a 
desired objective, the implementation of situational analyses, and the evaluation of 
potential outcomes until one of the available alternatives is adopted and put into action. 
Sometimes, the chosen course of action is further analyzed for sensitivity to 
perturbation and unexpected effects to ensure that the optimum decision has been 
taken, and if not for corrective actions to be evaluated. The research to address this 
question will be conducted according to the plan outlined below. 
5.1 Research Plan 
The research plan is defined in nine serial, incremental steps shown in Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6 - Research plan. 
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These steps are further described in Table 9 below: 
Table 9 - Research activities. 
Step Activity 
1-2 
After the development of a preliminary list of decision criteria derived from the literature, 
the initial AHP model shall be reviewed for completeness with a panel of experts in the 
field of technology standards 
3-5 
The updates from the reviews with the panel of experts shall be applied to the model and 
once again validated by the panel for agreement and corroboration 
6 
The final, validated model shall be quantified with pairwise comparison data, also supplied 
by panels of experts 
7 
The case of an extant technology standard shall be applied to the model as a final check for 
applicability of the general model to a specific case 
8 
The results shall be analyzed for consistency and sensitivity to gauge the strength and 
robustness of the model. The software application to carry out the computation of weights 
from the pairwise data shall be provided by the Engineering and Technology Management 
department at Portland State University 
9 
Related managerial implications, limitations of the study and a research agenda for future 
scholars shall be proposed to round out the findings 
 
The objective is to standardize a technology which implies participation in the 
relevant SDO. The preliminary framework contains ten decision criteria and four 
decision alternatives. The criteria are consistent with the literature along the ESOL 
perspectives identified in the literature review section. These criteria shall be validated 
with the panel of experts as described above and other layers of the hierarchy shall be 
developed in the same manner.  
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Figure 7 below depicts the mapping of the research perspectives to the criteria: 
 
Figure 7 - Mapping of ESOL perspectives to decision criteria. 
The various criteria are defined below as they map to the ESOL perspectives. 
Economic 
Criteria that pertain to costs inherent in technology standards development and 
the return on that investment (ROI) are mapped to the economic perspective.  
Cost is a measure of the long-term expenditures and financial outlays that would 
be committed by the ICT firm in its pursuit of technology standards. Since the 
development and on-going maintenance of technology standards can span multiple 
years, the ICT firm needs to adopt a long-term horizon relative to this criterion. Cost is 
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comprehensive of R&D, labor, capital and any other business expenditures in this 
context. 
ROI is a measure of benefits that accrue to the ICT firm in its pursuit of standards 
activities. It can comprehend tangible and intangible benefits, all of which must be 
converted to quantitative metrics for uniform assessment. The valuation of IP portfolio 
is germane to this criterion since it provides added precision to the assessment of ROI. 
Strategic 
Criteria that pertain to the alignment of the technology standards development 
activity relative to the corporate strategy, the scope of the technology standards 
development, industry ecosystem interactions and network externalities as well as the 
IP appropriability regime are mapped to the strategic perspective.  
The offensive-oriented firm will seek to join standards activities and contribute 
its IP for incorporation into multiple technology standards for the express purpose of 
exploiting the opportunity to collect rents and royalties from the licensing of its 
intellectual assets. The defensive-oriented firm will join standards development 
activities for the express purpose of obtaining licenses for the IP that it would be 
integrating into its standards-based products, and to protect itself from inadvertent 
infringement of said intellectual assets.  
The scope of the standards development activity pertains to corporate strategy 
as it can include or exclude portions of a firm’s IP portfolio with its attendant 
implications.  
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Network externalities can be deemed strategic in that they can expose the ICT 
firm to an ecosystem of partners, customers and complementors that could greatly 
enhance the function and value of its standards-based offerings.  
The appropriability regime in this regard pertains to the degree to which IP 
licensing is available for appropriation by the ICT firm. This concept is discussed in the 
literature and is germane to a decision-support framework.  
Organizational 
Criteria that pertain to the enrollment policy and the membership range, or 
depth and breadth, of the organization, as well as the geographical coverage of the 
standards development organization are mapped to the organizational perspective.  
The enrollment policy of the SDO can take many forms with implications to the 
management of the organization itself as well as the strategy of the ICT firm interested 
in joining the organization. It can be a completely open organization, a closed 
organization or somewhere in between these polar opposites where a firm could be 
invited to join based on certain desirability factors or ecosystem dependencies.  
SDOs attract a range of members. This can include commercial firms, 
government institutions, educational establishments, individuals and so on. This 
membership range has implications to the management of the organization itself as well 
as the strategy of the ICT firm interested in joining the organization.  
Legal 
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Criteria that pertain to the IPR licensing policy and the IP disclosure 
requirements of the SDO are mapped to the legal perspective.  
The IPR policy of the standards organization has a direct bearing on the decision 
of the firm to join a standards effort. IPR policy is explained in depth elsewhere in this 
paper. Essentially, the standards organizations can obligate the IP owner to license its IP 
free of royalties or it may not impose any such onus, thus enabling the firm to charge 
rents on its IP if it chose to do so. Many ICT firms have shown a distinct preference for a 
RAND IPR policy where royalties are not precluded. 
Rules governing IP disclosure vary from one organization to the next. This can be 
important since knowledge of IP reading on the technology standard can greatly 
influence the decision of the ICT firm in its pursuit of technology standardization. In 
general, IP disclosure can be completely passive and voluntary or actively required.  
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Having defined the decision criteria, the preliminary hierarchical construct for 
my research question is shown in Figure 8 below: 
 
Figure 8 – Preliminary hierarchy of the decision model. 
Four decision outcomes are identified. The first outcome (O1) is to join and 
strongly participate in, influence and drive the development of the standard. The second 
outcome (O2) is to join but to not actively participate and simply monitor the progress of 
the standards development as necessary. The third outcome (O3) is to join but only after 
exclusionary carve-out of certain intellectual assets have been negotiated from licensing 
obligations to protect the firm from committing the portion(s) of its portfolio that it 
deems to be too valuable to make available. The fourth outcome (O4) is to not join the 
standards development activity. Note that in the first two alternatives, the firm may be 
committing the relevant portions of its IP portfolio to licensing obligations. These 
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decision alternatives were derived through interviews of IP attorneys at various ICT and 
law firms familiar with technology standardization. 
5.2 Case Selection  
The proposed decision-support framework shall be corroborated with an extant 
technology standard. This will confirm the generalizability of the proposed decision 
model. The validity of the model is confirmed when the general and case-specific 
applications are deemed to be consistent. The case in question is that of the Universal 
Serial Bus (USB). 
5.2.1 Universal Serial Bus (USB) 
In the early 1990s peripheral devices that connected to a Personal Computer 
(PC) such as scanners, printers, personal digital assistants, cameras and so on, each had 
their own complicated installation procedure. In fact, many such connections required 
the complete shutdown of the system, manual installation of the hardware and 
requisite software, and a restart of the entire system followed by post-installation 
adjustments, before a simple data transfer could take place between the PC and the 
peripheral device such as a printer. 
With the growing popularity of the PC as a desktop printing and digital 
communications platform and the ever-increasing demand for connectivity with the 
burgeoning worldwide network of PCs connected to the Internet, conditions were ripe 
for a more efficient and convenient method to move data on or off devices without the 
hardship and the inefficient interruptions of the PC shutdown and reboot sequence.242  
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In recognizing this problem, Intel Corporation contributed technology from its 
research facilities to enable the low-cost and high-speed connectivity of peripheral 
devices to the PC platform with easy, plug-and-play simplicity. Intel spearheaded the 
formation of a group of influential industry leaders in developing an industry 
specification with royalty-free IP licensing made available to all adopters of the 
technology. This technology was dubbed the Universal Serial Bus (USB) and architected 
for the movement and storage of digital information between PCs and other digital 
devices through a cable. Intel led the integration of this technology in its chipset 
products and hosted many interoperability events to facilitate the adoption of the 
technology by other members of the USB ecosystem. The USB Implementers Forum 
(USB-IF) was formed in 1995 and later incorporated as an industry standards 
organization to support and accelerate the market adoption of USB-compliant products. 
Today, USB is a household name and is the preferred connectivity standard for 
nearly all major electronic and personal computing devices worldwide. The USB 
standard has displaced older and competing means of connectivity such as the parallel 
port or the 1394 (also known as FireWire) technology. In 2007, the Maximum PC 
magazine named USB the premier PC technology innovation of all time!243 By 2018, it is 
estimated that USB device shipments will exceed five billion units.244 
The selection of USB is justified given my considerable a posteriori acquaintance 
with this technology, access to knowledgeable experts, and the facile collection of 
reliable data. I collected data from technology managers involved in standards 
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development to analyze the relative priority of the various factors that were identified 
as important to the development of USB technology. Six factors—cost, usability, 
compatibility, synergy, longevity, leadership—were identified by these managers and 
ranked for importance to the decision to standardize USB. The results of the pairwise 
comparison computation are shown in Table 10 below: 
Table 10 - Factors influencing USB standardization (Neshati, 2009). 
Statistics Cost Usability Compatibility Synergy Longevity Leadership 
Max 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.15 
Min 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.08 
Mean 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.12 
Std. Dev. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Rank 4 (Tie) 2 1 3 4 (Tie) 6 
 
The respondents rated compatibility with existing standards and infrastructures 
as the highest priority consideration in the development of USB, followed closely by 
functionality and usability as well as strategic synergy with business objectives. Contrary 
to expectations, cost of development and longevity of the standard were rated lower, 
tied for fourth place in the rankings, with leadership opportunities for the firm bringing 
up the rear. The key learning from this study highlights the importance of continuity, 
through generational compatibility, when developing a technology standard like USB. 
5.3 Validating the Model 
The proposed model will be verified for construct, content and criterion validity. 
Construct validity pertains to the relationship between various measurable metrics 
within a model and verifies that the proposed model construction is relevant to the 
research at hand. Content validity pertains to the scope and comprehensiveness of the 
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measurable metrics within a model and verifies that the proposed model content 
provides for sufficient research depth and breadth. Criterion validity pertains to the 
instrumentality and relevance of the various decision criteria and sub-criteria that 
appear in the model. This is shown in Table 11 below: 
Table 11 - Model validation. 
Validation Type Description 
Construct 
The degree to which theoretical concepts and the structure of the model 
conform to praxis and/or expectations of the experts 
Content 
The degree to which the inclusion of individual model elements relate to praxis 
and/or expectations of the experts 
Criterion 
The degree of the effectiveness of the model in prioritizing current/future 
considerations and/or expectations of the experts 
 
Validation of the model construct and content is accomplished through 
interviews and feedback received from Panel 1. This validation is performed after the 
development of the preliminary model using instrument I.3 (Model Development 
Instrument) shown below. Validation of the model criteria is accomplished through 
interviews and feedback received from Panels 2a and 2b. This validation is performed 
after the development of the updated model using instrument I.4 (Model Validation 
Instrument) shown below. These validation steps are performed prior to the 
compilation of the judgment quantifications from the experts and the post facto model 
analysis.  
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Furthermore, two important scores, Inconsistency and Disagreement, are used 
to vet the model as described below and shown in Table 12: 
Table 12 - Inconsistencies and disagreements in pairwise comparisons. 
Inconsistency Disagreement 
Measures consistency in the judgment of an 
individual expert (member of a panel) 
Measures agreement among judgment results of 
the group (a panel of experts) 
By convention, tolerance threshold is 10% By convention, tolerance threshold is 10% 
1
𝑛
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1
𝑛!
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Despite inconsistencies and disagreements in judgment quantification, scholars 
have shown that the principal eigenvector is a reliable measure for differentiating ranks 
of the matrix elements provided that the threshold is less than or equal to the 10% 
benchmark.245 246 The sections below describe mitigation methods for inconsistencies 
and disagreements. 
5.3.1 Inconsistency 
As judgment quantification relies on the knowledge of experts, putatively, data 
from human subjects may be inconsistent at times. Inconsistency is measured as the 
variance in the values of each orientation relative to the mean.247 Consider that in 
pairwise comparisons, for n decision elements n! orientations exist, such as abc, acb, 
bac, bca and so on, representing the various comparison matrices. These orientations 
may have slight variance in the relative values of the elements in the presence of 
judgment inconsistency.  
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A score of 0 implies perfect consistency by the expert. By convention, the 
tolerance threshold for inconsistency is set at 10% (0.1).  
In this analysis, discordant judgment data will be removed from consideration. In 
effect, data from an inconsistent expert will not be used in the final quantified model. 
5.3.2 Disagreement 
In judgment quantification it is possible for panelists to disagree with each other 
in their pairwise assessments of the same pair of elements. Given m experts and n 
decision elements, disagreement is computed as the variance in the value of the mean 
value assigned by the jth expert to the ith element relative to the group.248  
A score of 0 implies perfect agreement among the panelists. By convention, the 
tolerance threshold for disagreement is set at 10% (0.1). 
In this analysis, where there is significant disagreement among the panelists the 
assessments of the experts will be further reviewed and, if necessary, the panels will be 
reconstituted with experts along similar levels of expertise or job functions to mitigate 
the group disagreement. 
5.4 Data Collection 
Data for this study is primarily supplied by panels of experts immersed in 
technology standardization. This expert panel methodology is commonly used in 
qualitative research spanning several disciplines, including business, medicine, social 
sciences and other fields of scholarly enquiry as demonstrated by Mervis (1993), Smith 
and Ford (1993), Kiernan (1994), Strickland and Berman (1995), and others.249 250 251 252   
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5.4.1 Data Collection Instruments 
Table 13 describes the various data collection instruments used in this research: 
Table 13 - Data collection instruments. 
Phase Instrument Purpose Data Collected Method 
0 Model 
Development 
(I.1 and I.2) 
 
Review the 
preliminary model 
and provide feedback 
on additional 
Perspectives and 
Criteria 
Broad spectrum of 
responses on model 
ingredients and numerous 
suggestions for the 
inclusion of additional 
Criteria and one new 
Perspective 
Open-ended questions 
to elicit a wide range of 
responses on the 
preliminary  model and 
leeway to edit the 
model 
1 Model 
Validation  
(I.3) 
Validate the updated 
model for construct, 
content and criteria, 
and generate the 
final model 
Binary checklist expressing 
experts’ [dis]agreements 
w/ inclusion of model 
elements from Phase 1 
Computation of µ for 
each element and 
elimination of elements 
w/ ˂ 67% (i.e. 2/3 
majority) 
2 Model 
Quantification 
– Perspectives 
(I.4) 
Quantify the model 
at the Perspectives 
layer of the hierarchy 
PCM data for Perspectives 
when judged against the 
Objective layer (i.e. root) 
of the hierarchy 
Constant sum, w/ 10% 
threshold for 
Inconsistency and 
Disagreement 
3 Model 
Quantification 
– Criteria  
(I.5) 
Quantify the model 
at the Criteria layer 
of the hierarchy 
PCM data for Criteria 
when judged against the 
Perspectives layer of the 
hierarchy 
Constant sum, w/ 10% 
threshold for 
Inconsistency and 
Disagreement 
4 Model 
Quantification 
– Outcomes 
(I.6) 
Quantify the model 
at the Outcomes 
layer of the hierarchy 
PCM data for Outcomes 
when judged against the 
Criteria layer of the 
hierarchy (each criterion) 
Constant sum, w/ 10% 
threshold for 
Inconsistency and 
Disagreement 
 
All of these instruments are produced in Appendix A. All panelists were required 
to read and acknowledge instruments I.1 (Subject Recruitment), and I.2 (Informed 
Consent). 
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5.4.2 Expert Panels 
As shown in Table 14, five panels of experts are used to collect data for analysis: 
Table 14 - Expert panel composition. 
Panel 
Compositio
n 
E:S:O:L Breakdown Function 
Panel 1 36 experts 10:10:9:7 Review preliminary model, update & validate the model 
Panel 2a 29 experts 9:9:6:5 Quantify the Perspectives & Criteria for the General case 
Panel 2b 15 experts 2:6:3:4 Quantify the Perspectives & Criteria for the USB case 
Panel 3a 10 experts 2:3:1:4 Quantify the Outcomes for the General case 
Panel 3b 7 experts 1:1:1:4 Quantify the Outcomes for the USB case 
 
The panels are representative of several areas of expertise in the ICT industry 
such as technology managers, corporate executives with decision-making authority in 
matters related to technology standardization, engineers with substantial experience in 
SDO participation, and IP attorneys with expertise in patent and antitrust law, SDO 
incorporation and related legal issues. Panelists are drawn from various ICT firms 
representing diverse job functions to ensure balanced input in the dataset as well as 
from a variety of sources, including silicon component manufacturers, integrated 
systems developers, software vendors, measurement analysis tools providers, and so 
on. Figure 9 below depicts the panel functions: 
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Figure 9 - Panels of experts and their functions. 
Panelists are selected using these constraints to ensure balanced representation: 
 Proven expertise in technology standardization in the ICT industry 
 Broad representation comprising hardware, software and integrated systems 
 Knowledge of other panel participants to compensate for individual bias 
 Absence of conflict between panel participants to avoid skewed data 
 Avoidance of overly passive and overly active panelists to ensure fair participation 
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The distribution of the participating ICT firms, the job functions of the panelists 
mapped to the ESOL perspectives and their geographical spread is depicted in Table 15: 
Table 15 - Expert panel distribution. 
Company 
Job Function 
Geography 
Manager (E) Executive (S) Engineer (O) Attorney (L) 
IBM X    USA 
TI  X   USA 
Intel   X  USA 
Intel  X   USA 
Toshiba   X  EU 
Intel    X USA 
Intel   X  USA 
TI   X  EU 
Intel X    USA 
Intel    X USA 
Intel  X   USA 
AMD X    Canada 
Cadence X    China 
Marvell X    EU 
Intel  X   USA 
VTM   X  USA 
Intel  X   USA 
Broadcom X    Vietnam 
NEC/Renases   X  Japan 
HP  X   USA 
Intel    X USA 
Intel    X USA 
VTM  X   USA 
Agilent X    EU 
Qualcomm   X  India 
Intel  X   USA 
Qualcomm X    USA 
Synopsys X    USA 
Intel   X  USA 
Intel  X   USA 
SWW    X USA 
Dell   X  USA 
VTM X    USA 
Microsoft  X   ME 
MM    X USA 
KS    X USA 
TOTAL 10 10 9 7  
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The four job functions, Manager, Executive, Engineer and Attorney, are mapped 
directly to the ESOL perspective, respectively. In this context, a manager is any person 
with people or project management responsibilities and thus closer to the economic 
aspects of the decision to participate in technology standardization. An executive is any 
person with leadership responsibilities and thus closer to the strategic aspects of the 
decision to participate in technology standardization. An engineer is any person with 
technology innovation and development responsibilities and thus closer to the 
organizational aspects of the decision to participate in technology standardization. And, 
finally, an attorney is any person with advice and council responsibilities and thus closer 
to the legal aspects of the decision to participate in technology standardization. 
In obtaining PCM data for the assessment of criteria within each of the ESOL 
perspectives, panelists data will be used in the following manner: data from managers 
will be used to assess the economic criteria, data from executives will be used to assess 
the strategic criteria, data from engineers will be used to assess the organizational 
criteria, and data from attorneys will be used to assess the legal criteria. In this way, any 
bias that inadvertently may creep in to the judgment quantifications will be avoided as a 
result of a panelist providing data in an area not considered to be their primary job. 
While the panelists are drawn chiefly from ICT firms based in the US (72%), there 
are many panelists from other regions such as the EU (11%), the Asia-Pacific region (8%), 
and other geographies. Semiconductor manufacturers (47%) and system integrators 
(14%) comprise the majority of the panelists, but there are significant participants from 
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the services industries, including the legal profession (19%) and SDO administration 
firms (8%). From an ESOL perspective, the panelists are fairly evenly distributed.  
The geographical, business and ESOL perspective are shown in Figure 10: 
 
Figure 10 - Expert panel breakdowns. 
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5.4.3 Model Progression Process 
The model progression followed the process as shown in Figure 11 below: 
 
Figure 11 - Model progression steps. 
Panel 1 reviewed the preliminary model, provided updates and validated the 
final model. This is shown as steps 1-4 above. Panels 2a and 2b provided judgment data 
to quantify the perspectives and criteria layers of the hierarchy, for the General and USB 
models respectively. Panels 3a and 3b provided judgment data to quantify the outcomes 
layer of the hierarchy, for the General and USB models respectively. These are shown as 
steps 5-6 above. The complete model development process is documented in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Model Development and Results  
From a thoroughgoing review of the academic literature, I have identified four 
perspectives on technology standardization relevant to ICT firms. These perspectives 
are: Economic, Strategic, Organizational and Legal (ESOL). Each of the perspectives are 
cogently explained and integrated into the AHP model. The cataloging of these 
perspectives is the first in a series of results from my research. 
The preliminary model was sent to the panel of experts who were asked to 
review and to suggest improvements to it. The updated model with the integration of 
input from all panelists was sent back to the experts once again and this time they were 
asked to validate the various elements of the model. The resulting validated model was 
quantified at all levels of the hierarchy by different panels of experts for the General 
case and for the chosen USB case application. Finally, the General and the USB models 
were contrasted and analyzed for congruency, consistency among panelists and for 
sensitivity to arbitrary change.  
These outcomes are explained in greater detail below. 
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6.1 Model Development 
In this phase of research, experts on Panel 1 were asked to complete I.3 (Model 
Development instrument). The updated model is shown in Figure 12: 
 
Figure 12 - Updated model. 
Relative to the preliminary model, this version contains 1 new perspective and 
25 new decision criteria. None of the input from the panelists was ignored or omitted 
and thus the revised model is comprehensive of all input.  
The new perspective was identified as environmental/social, which is a 
perspective that is not pervasive in the extant academic literature. Ipso facto, this could 
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be due to the recent significance of the role of technology standardization as an 
environmental or societal phenomenon.  
Since this updated model was a compilation of blind input by all panelists, it 
needed to be validated by the group as a whole as described in the following section. 
6.2 Model Validation 
In this phase of research, all experts on Panel 1 were asked to complete I.4 
(Model Validation instrument). The validation data used to finalize the model is shown 
in Table 16 below:  
Table 16 - Model validation data. 
Perspectives Agree Disagree % 
Economic 28 1 97 
Strategic 29 0 100 
Organizational 27 2 93 
Legal 29 0 100 
Environmental 19 19 66 
Economic Criteria Agree Disagree % 
Market Expansion 27 2 93 
Opportunity Cost 26 3 90 
R&D Savings 23 6 79 
IP Revenue 23 6 79 
TTM Incentives 20 9 69 
Cost of Absence 24 5 83 
Cost of Presence 23 6 79 
Tangible ROI 23 6 79 
Intangible ROI 26 3 90 
Strategic Criteria Agree Disagree % 
Enabling Rivals 17 12 59 
Growing Expertise 28 1 97 
Developing Adjacency 20 9 69 
Alternative Technologies 19 10 66 
Trends/Disruptions 26 3 90 
Technology Scope 20 9 69 
Appropriability 27 2 93 
Network Externality 28 1 97 
Product Alignment 27 2 93 
Organizational Criteria Agree Disagree % 
Governance 28 1 97 
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Funding 24 5 83 
Certification Program 29 0 100 
Rules/Procedures 27 2 93 
Efficiency 27 2 93 
Technical/Marketing Focus 28 1 97 
Member Contribution 28 1 97 
Partnerships 27 2 93 
Enrollment Policy 23 6 79 
Membership Depth 20 9 69 
Legal Criteria Agree Disagree % 
Incorporation 26 3 90 
Tax Status 15 14 52 
Antitrust Enforcement 25 4 86 
IP Disclosure Requirement 27 2 93 
IPR Licensing Policy 28 1 97 
Environmental Criteria Agree Disagree % 
Government Regulation 22 7 76 
Technology Diffusion 24 5 83 
  
All elements that did not garner the consent of a simple majority of the panelists 
(2/3 or approximately 67% agreement) were eliminated from further consideration. The 
resultant model is shown in Figure 13 below: 
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Figure 13 - Final, validated model. 
The final, validated model is comprised of the 4 ESOL perspectives, 28 criteria 
and 4 outcomes.  
The definitions of the decision criteria are depicted in Table 17: 
Table 17 – Definition of decision criteria. 
Perspective Criterion Abbr. Definition 
Economic 
Market Expansion ME 
Access to new markets and opportunity 
to expand standards-based products to 
adjacent markets 
Opportunity Cost OC 
Financial assets that could be used for 
activities other than technology 
standardization 
R&D Savings RD 
Savings in R&D investments arising from 
access to contributed technologies by 
other firms in SDOs 
IP Revenue IR 
Revenues generated as a result of the 
licensing of intellectual assets to other 
members of the SDO/industry 
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Cost of Absence CA 
Total estimated cost of missing out on 
standardization over the life of the 
technology 
Cost of Presence CP 
Total estimated cost of participating in 
standardization over the life of the 
technology 
Tangible ROI/Recoupment TR 
Total estimated return or benefit from 
the investment in standardization over 
the life of the technology 
Strategic 
Grow Expertise GE 
Growth of hitherto unavailable technical 
expertise from participation in 
standardization 
Trends & Disruptions TD 
Ability to detect emerging trends and 
technological disruptions from 
participation in SDOs 
Appropriability AP 
License availability for the critical IP for 
interoperable product development and 
ease of technology adoption 
Network Externality NE 
Exposure to networks and ecosystem of 
customers, complementors and 
competitors 
Product Alignment PA 
Alignment of product plans and 
roadmaps to the emerging technology 
standard 
Diffusion of Technology DT 
Ability to broadly diffuse technologies to 
gain advantage through familiarity and 
dependencies on IP portfolio 
Intangible ROI/Leadership IR 
Non-financial returns on investment such 
as industry leadership, prestige and other 
visible forms of status 
Organizational 
Governance GO 
Accountable leadership and strong 
adherence to democratic governance for 
representative administration of the SDO 
Funding FU 
Adequate funding and income generation 
by the SDO for long-term operation and 
stability 
Certification Program CP 
Ability of the SDO to administer programs 
to test conformance to the specification 
to ensure interoperable implementations 
Rules & Procedures RP 
Availability and adherence to fair, 
transparent and uniformly applied sets of 
rules and procedures 
Operational Efficiency OE 
Overall efficiency of the SDO, its speed of 
execution, timely promotion of standards 
and other considerations 
Technical/Marketing Focus FO 
Primary focus of the SDO – 
technical/technology development, 
marketing or other 
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Member Contributions MC 
Ability of SDO members to contribute 
technologies during the 
definition/development of standards 
Partnerships PA 
Ability and experience of the SDO in 
forming partnerships with other SDOs to 
promote standards 
Enrollment Policies EP 
Flexibility of the SDO in accepting new 
members to participate in standards 
development 
Legal 
Incorporation IN 
Legal status of the SDO as a recognized 
for-profit or non-profit entity with and 
elected Board of Directors and Officers 
Antitrust Enforcement AN 
Adherence of the SDO to antitrust 
monitoring and timely action when 
violations are detected 
IP Disclosure Requirements ID 
IP disclosure requirements and related 
policies of the SDO that will identify 
essential patents reading on the standard 
IPR Licensing IL 
IP license availability consistent with the 
IPR policies of the SDO on reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms 
Government Regulations GR 
Government mandated regulations that 
bear on the work product of the SDO 
such as restrictions or other limitations 
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6.3 Model Quantification 
In this phase of research, the model is scored with the judgment of the experts 
using the equation shown in Figure 14: 
 
Figure 14 - Aggregate score equation and symbol definition. 
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The experts on Panels 2a and 3a were asked to complete I.5 (Model 
Quantification Instrument – Criteria). The result is shown in Figure 15 below: 
 
Figure 15 - Quantified model (General). 
The experts rated the strategic perspective highest among the 4 ESOL 
perspectives with a score of 38% and rated the organizational perspective lowest with a 
score of only 9%.  
Among the criteria, Product Alignment (PA) is rated highest by the experts under 
the strategic perspective. 
The decision outcome preferred by the experts is O1 with a score of 39% with O4 
rated lowest at 14%.  
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The experts on Panels 3a and 3b were asked to complete I.6 (Model 
Quantification Instrument – Outcomes). The result is shown in Figure 16 below: 
 
Figure 16 - Quantified model (USB). 
In the case of the USB model too the experts rated the strategic perspective 
highest among the 4 ESOL perspectives with a score of 44% and rated the organizational 
perspective lowest with a score of only 9%. This is consistent with the General model. 
Among the criteria, Product Alignment (PA) is rated highest by the experts, 
which is consistent with the General model. 
The decision outcome preferred by the experts is O1 with a score of 36% with O4 
rated lowest at 14%. This, too, is consistent with the results obtained in the General 
model. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis of Results 
As mentioned, the use of expert judgments involves subjectivity among the input 
sources. To ensure an effective use of subjective data in a quantitative decision model, 
the data must be checked for inconsistencies, disagreements and sensitivities.  
A simple method to check for sensitivity of decision alternatives with respect to 
the criteria follows a “what-if” scenario wherein weight assignments are  incrementally 
altered one at a time while holding all others constant, to determine if that incremental 
change induces a different outcome or result.253 These perturbations are performed 
systematically over the entire matrix of criteria and alternatives. Where sensitivities are 
found to alter the initial model result, further analysis can be performed to determine 
the relationship and dependence of the factors involved in the change.  
In my analysis I will systematically vary the weights of perspective and criteria 
nodes to assess the sensitivity and robustness of the model. 
7.1 Model Scores 
In reviewing the results for both the General and USB models there are some 
inconsistencies that need to be mitigated but the disagreement scores are generally 
below the expected threshold. These results are discussed below. 
7.1.1 Inconsistency Scores 
Most of the experts’ data was consistent but there were some experts that 
exhibited inconsistencies. Table 18 below depicts the expert inconsistency scores: 
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Table 18 - Inconsistency scores for all panels. 
Phase Panel Panelist Model Inconsistency 
2 2a Expert02 General 0.16 
2 2b Expert02 USB 0.18 
2 2b Expert03 USB 0.22 
3 2a Expert15 General 0.14 
3 2a Expert27 General 0.16 
3 2a Expert15 General 0.24 
3 2a Expert16 General 0.17 
3 2a Expert27 General 0.11 
3 2a Expert29 General 0.14 
3 2b Expert03 USB 0.17 
3 2a Expert14 General 0.15 
4 3b Expert05 USB 0.18 
4 3b Expert06 USB 0.15 
 
The data from these inconsistent experts were removed from both the General 
and USB models which caused slight modifications to the weight computations of the 
perspectives, criteria and outcomes elements at each layer of the model hierarchy. 
None of these changes, however, had any material impact on the priority or ranking of 
the various elements, nor did they have any impact on the decision outcome. The 
removal of inconsistent data from the model improves its overall robustness and 
increases confidence in the derived results. 
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The revised side-by-side scores for both the General and USB models are shown 
in Figure 17 below, with the numbers on the right (in blue color) representing the 
General model and the numbers on the left (in red color) representing the USB model: 
 
Figure 17 - Final model scores without inconsistencies. 
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7.1.2 Disagreement Scores 
Table 19 below shows the panel disagreement scores: 
Table 19 - Disagreement scores for all panels. 
Hierarchy Layer Model Disagreement Explanation 
Perspectives 
General 0.12 
Expert13 (SW engineer) and Expert25 
(IP attorney) disagree 
USB 0.04 Below threshold 
Criteria – Economic 
General 0.09 Below threshold 
USB 0.08 Below threshold 
Criteria – Strategic 
General 0.06 Below threshold 
USB 0.06 Below threshold 
Criteria – Organizational 
General 0.03 Below threshold 
USB 0.05 Below threshold 
Criteria - Legal 
General 0.08 Below threshold 
USB 0.07 Below threshold 
Outcomes 
General 0.09 Below threshold 
USB 0.10 At threshold 
 
Except for one score noted above, the disagreement scores do not pose a 
problem as they are all at or below the accepted threshold. The exception in this case is 
not significant since the score is fairly low and the reason for the disagreement can be 
fathomed from a closer look at the expert’s job functions and thus their varying 
experiences and priorities. Specifically, Expert13, a software engineer, and Expert25, an 
attorney, provided data that were significantly at odds with that from the other experts. 
These disagreements are expected when the panel is sufficiently large and diverse. A 
disagreement score of 0.12, however, although above the acceptable threshold of 0.10, 
is not sufficiently large to have a material impact on the overall quality of the results. 
7.1.3 Key Scores and Findings Summarized 
From the final model scores shown in Figure 17 above, it is clear that: 
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1. Both models highlight strategy as the primary perspective. Effectively, technology 
standardization is a strategic decision for most ICT firms. 
2. Both models confirm Market Expansion (ME) as the most important economic factor 
in pursuing technology standards. In other words, ICT firms view standardization as 
an enabler to grow their availability and access to core and adjacent markets. 
3. Both models confirm Product Alignment (PA) as the most important strategic factor 
in pursuing technology standards. This is evidence that ICT firms are interested to 
align their product roadmaps with the content and entry of technology standards. 
4. Both models confirm IPR Licensing (IL) as the most important legal factor in pursuing 
technology standards. The availability of licenses and the IPR policies of the SDO 
rank high for most ICT firms. 
5. Both models point to the similar decision outcome: O1. In effect, ICT firms prefer to 
join the SDO in question and drive the standard effort to reap the various benefits 
that accrue from engagement at this level of involvement and influence. 
In the sections that follow, results from each layer of the hierarchy will be 
further analyzed and discussed. 
7.1.4 ESOL Perspectives 
For the ESOL perspectives, strategic is rated highest by both panels, followed by 
economic, legal and organizational. The weight of the organizational perspective has 
changed little between the two panels and is deemed to be an insignificant factor in the 
decision to standardize technologies. Panel 2a rated the legal perspective 21% higher. 
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This may be due to the less litigious environment in the ICT industry when USB was 
being standardized in the early 1990s; in more recent times IP-related legal 
entanglements have multiplied. Panel 2a rated the strategic perspective 11% lower. This 
may be partly offsetting the increase in the importance of the legal aspects of 
standardization, resulting in a relative tradeoff in priorities. There is negligible difference 
in the relative weight placed on the economic perspective between the panels. 
7.1.5 Economic Criteria 
For the economic criteria, Market Expansion (ME) is consistently rated highest by 
both panels. Indeed, the standardization of USB increased market opportunities for its 
early proponents as shown by Gawer and Cusumano (2002). Opportunity Cost (OC) is 
rated 30% higher by the experts on Panel 2b. R&D Savings (RD) is rated 33% higher in 
importance by experts in Panel 2a over their peers in Panel 2b. Panel 2b experts rated IP 
Revenues (IP) higher by 33%, emphasizing the opportunities in harvesting USB IP at its 
introduction. Panel 2b judged Cost of Absence (CA) higher by about 24%. Panel 2a rated 
Cost of Presence (CP) higher by about 33%, reflecting the growing costs in attending 
SDOs. Panel 2a rated Tangible ROI (TR) 41% higher, reflecting expectations of economic 
gains and recoupment of investments through technology standardization. 
7.1.6 Strategic Criteria 
For the strategic criteria, Product Alignment (PA) is rated higher than other 
criteria by both panels. Panel 2b rated Trends/Disruptions (TD) higher by 19%, 
confirming its importance at the time of USB adoption. Network Externality (NE) is rated 
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higher by Panel 2a by 27%, reflecting the importance of ecosystems in standardization. 
Experts on Panel 2a rated Intangible ROI/Leadership (IR) higher by about 13%, 
suggesting that ICT firms expect to establish leadership in the ecosystem through 
standardization. This finding was also observed by Gawer and Cusumano (2002). 
7.1.7 Organizational Criteria 
For the organizational criteria, Rules/Procedures (RP) & Organizational Efficiency 
(OE) are rated highest by both panels consistently. There are negligible differences in 
the panels’ ranking of Enrollment Policy (EP) of the SDO. Panel 2b rated Governance 
(GO) and Funding (FU) higher by over 30%, reflecting the need for a smooth functioning 
SDO. Panel 2a rated Certification Program (CP) higher by 30%, suggesting the growing 
importance of product interoperability in the ecosystem. Panel 2b rated organizational 
Focus (FO) higher by 14%, suggesting the importance of proper marketing to position 
USB technology in the market. Panel 2a rated Partnerships (PA) higher by 50%, showing 
a strong preference for SDO collaboration. 
7.1.8 Legal Criteria 
For the legal criteria, both panels rated IPR Licensing (IL) as the highest 
consideration, followed by IP Disclosure (ID) and Antitrust (AN). This is in keeping with 
expectations since a major component of technology standardization is the availability 
of licenses to IP held by others in the ecosystem, the need for a priori disclosure of 
essential IP and the SDO enforcement of its antitrust policies. Panel 2a rated 
Incorporation (IN) higher by 28%. This suggest that in more recent times SDOs seek to 
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take advantage of the benefits inherent in better organization, transparent/democratic 
governance and more favorable tax treatments provided under the law (such as 
501(c)(6)). Panel 2b rated Government Regulation (GR) higher by roughly 36%. 
7.1.9 Composite Outcome Scores 
For the global outcome scores, the highest decision alternative from the 
preferences of both panels is O1 (Join & Drive Standard). Both panels rated O2 (Join & 
Monitor Standard) as the next highest preference. Both panels exhibited consistency in 
the choice of O3 (Join & Exclude IP) in that this alternative was the third-most preferred 
outcome. O4 (Do Not Join) was the least favorite outcome of both panels. Panel 3a 
showed a nearly 18% higher preference for O1 while Panel 3b showed a nearly 12% 
higher preference for the same outcome. 
7.2 Key Decision Factors 
As was observed, both panels rated the strategic perspective as the highest 
consideration in this decision. Also, both rated Product Alignment (PA) as the highest 
decision criterion, constituting nearly 8% and 10% of the total decision score in the 
General and USB models, respectively.  
The computed eigenvalues show that the top 5 criteria differ slightly between 
the two panels. In the General model the other top factors in order of priority are IPR 
Licensing (IL), Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD) and Intangible 
ROI/Leadership (IR), while in the USB model the other top factors in order of priority are 
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Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD), Cost of Absence (CA) and IPR Licensing 
(IL). Further analysis of these findings will be discussed in the next chapter. 
7.3 Model Sensitivity 
Using the aforementioned “what-if” scenarios, extreme weights are assigned at 
the perspective layer of the hierarchy to determine the sensitivity of the General and 
USB models to such perturbations. Three different profiles are used as follows: 
Profile 1: for each perspective in turn, assign a 70% weight while holding the 
other perspectives at a uniformly low weight of 10%. 
Profile 2: eliminate the organizational perspective and its criteria since they do 
not appear to be significant, re-normalize the weights for the other perspectives and 
repeat the method described in Profile 1 with weights of 80% and 10%, respectively. 
Profile 3: eliminate the organizational perspective and its criteria since they do 
not appear to be significant, re-normalize the weights for the other perspectives and 
repeat the method described in Profile 1 with weights of 98% and 1%, respectively.  
With the removal of the organizational perspective and the re-normalization of 
the weights at the perspectives layer of the hierarchy and the criteria contributions to 
the outcomes layer of the hierarchy, each of these “what-if” profiles was applied to 
determine the model’s overall sensitivity to extreme perturbations. The results are 
shown in Table 20.  
The Baseline scores are the weights of the four outcomes when there are no 
perturbations. The scores in the E, S, O, and L columns depict the change in outcome 
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scores when each of the profiles is applied, with the higher weight being applied to the 
identified perspective in that column. 
Table 20 - Sensitivity scores for both models. 
Profile Model Outcome Baseline E S O L 
Profile 1 
70% 
General 
O1 38 36 42 39 31 
O2 25 24 27 22 23 
O3 23 24 21 23 25 
O4 14 16 10 16 21 
 
Profile 1 
70% 
USB 
O1 34 34 36 36 31 
O2 26 24 28 23 24 
O3 24 24 24 24 25 
O4 16 18 12 17 20 
 
Profile 2 
80% 
General 
O1 37 35 42 NA 30 
O2 26 25 28 NA 23 
O3 23 24 21 NA 25 
O4 14 16 9 NA 22 
 
Profile 2 
80% 
USB 
O1 34 33 35 NA 30 
O2 26 24 29 NA 25 
O3 24 25 24 NA 24 
O4 16 18 12 NA 21 
 
Profile 3 
98% 
General 
O1 37 34 45 NA 28 
O2 26 25 28 NA 22 
O3 23 25 20 NA 25 
O4 14 16 7 NA 25 
 
Profile 3 
98% 
USB 
O1 34 34 36 NA 31 
O2 26 24 28 NA 24 
O3 24 24 24 NA 25 
O4 16 18 12 NA 20 
 
There are some changes in the weight distributions among the outcomes but in 
all instances O1 leads the decision. The most perturbation is observed when the legal 
perspective is arbitrarily weighted high as in Profile 3. When this is done, the composite 
scores for the decision alternatives begin to level out as can be seen for the General 
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model. A similar phenomenon is observed in the USB model, which was weakly 
emergent when the organizational perspective was included in the model. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion of Findings  
From the results documented in chapters 6 and 7 it can be seen that the overall 
finding of this research points to the increasing importance of strategic decision-making 
in determining whether or not to join a standards development activity. Both the 
General model and the USB model substantiate this finding. In both cases, the economic 
and legal perspectives lag behind the strategic perspective in importance.  
The global scores of all criteria in the General model appear in Figure 18 below: 
 
Figure 18 - Global criteria scores for the General model. 
The global scores of all criteria in the USB model appear in Figure 19 below: 
 
Figure 19 - Global criteria scores for the USB model. 
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8.1 Key Findings 
Both models confirm Product Alignment (PA) as the top criterion informing the 
decision to participate in technology standardization. In the General model, this 
criterion accounts for over 8% of the total decision score. In the USB model, this number 
is even higher, accounting for over 10% of the total decision score. The experts believe 
that aligning the firm’s corporate strategy and product roadmap to the emerging 
standard is the highest consideration in the decision to join standards development.  
IPR Licensing (IL), Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD) and Intangible 
ROI/Leadership (IR) are ranked right behind Product Alignment in the General model, 
whereas Market Expansion (ME), Trends/Disruptions (TD), Cost of Absence (CA) and IPR 
Licensing (IL) appear in that order in the USB model.  
In the General model, three of the top five considerations are strategic, one is 
legal and one is economic, whereas in the USB model, two of the top five considerations 
are strategic, two are economic and one is legal, in that order. All the organizational 
criteria are rated at the bottom of the pile for both models. 
IPR Licensing (IL) is the second highest priority in the General model, whereas it 
is the fifth highest priority in the USB model. Market Expansion (ME) is the third highest 
priority in the General model, whereas it is the second highest priority in the USB model. 
Trends/Disruptions (TD) is the fourth highest priority in the General model, whereas it is 
the third highest priority in the USB model. Finally, Intangible ROI/Leadership (IR) is the 
fifth highest priority in the General model but it does not make the top five in the USB 
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model, whereas Cost of Absence (CA) is the fourth highest priority in the USB model but 
it does not make the top five in the General model. 
Both models agree in weighing the O1 (Join & Drive Standard) decision outcome 
highest, although with variable weights amongst the two models. This finding favors the 
active participation in, and contributions to, SDOs as confirmed by Gawer (2000). 
In the USB model, the economic perspective shows a measurable distance 
between it and legal considerations. This is a reflection of the fact that in the 1990s the 
ICT industry was less litigious, and there were fewer “IP wars” then as opposed to now. 
The model developed here has been shown to be robust and insensitive to 
extreme perturbations in the data. Even with radical weight redistribution, the models 
do not yield a different decision outcome, although the weight differences narrow in 
some cases. Further, almost all disagreements within the panels are well below the 
conventional threshold and all data from experts exhibiting inconsistency in their 
judgment quantifications have been eliminated from the computation of eigenvalues. 
8.2 Research Contributions 
My research has enriched scholarship in technology management, specifically in 
the area of standardization, in a number of ways as summarized in Table 21 below:  
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Table 21 - Research contributions. 
 Contribution Type 
Holistic ESOL framework and robust MCDA model that can be used by managers to 
assess the key determinants of the decision to participate in technology 
standardization (i.e. join SDO) 
Praxis 
Taxonomy and insights on the variances between the IPR policies of different SDOs 
in the ICT industry, and their influence on the diffusion and adoption of 
technological innovations  
Praxis 
Identification of the most and least important determinants in the decision to 
standardize a technology, and verified by the application of the USB case as the 
basis for comparison/contrast 
Praxis 
Path-dependent “best practices” as a non-tautological strategy to minimize 
resource allocation and maximize competitive advantage within the Transaction 
Cost paradigm and related theories of the firm 
Theory 
 
8.2.1 Contributions to Praxis 
First, the definition and application of the ESOL framework facilitates the 
contextualization of technology standards within the economic, strategic, organizational 
and legal perspectives. Such a multi-perspective structure, heretofore absent from 
scholarship in this field, allows managers to adopt a more balanced and all-inclusive 
approach in formulating the decision to join a given SDO, and to place emphasis where 
it matters most for achieving the firm’s imperatives and objectives. Specifically, the 
ESOL framework can be used to disaggregate and assess the chief factors that are 
germane to the firm in its decision-making processes and structures with regard to the 
standardization of innovative technologies. The significance of this contribution is 
confirmed through feedback received from the experts who are directly involved in the 
development of technology standards. 
Next, my development of a robust, MCDA model to assist managers in ICT firms 
in determining whether or not to participate in technology standards development fills a 
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major gap identified in praxis and confirmed by experts in the field. My proposed model 
identifies and ranks the most and least important determinants in the decision to 
standardize a technology. The import of this contribution is corroborated through the 
application of the USB case and borne out by the response of the experts to my findings.  
Finally, to smooth the progress of the diffusion and adoption of technological 
innovations through standards I have expatiated the implications of the varying 
intellectual property rights management of SDOs. In deciding to participate in 
technology standards development the firm may be obliged to offer license to its IP 
portfolio that read on the standard to other members of the SDO. In effect, the firm 
could coincidentally counteract some or all of the advantages derived from the exclusive 
privilege of exercising the protected knowledge and methods inherent in its intellectual 
assets such as patents. Knowledge about and transparency in IPR policy definition and 
enforcement impacts the decision to join or to not join the SDO as has been shown.  
8.2.2 Contributions to Theory 
My research contributes to the extant Production Cost theory in considerable 
ways. It is evident that the firm’s internal resources and assets, including IP, potentially 
play a significant part in its prospects and motivations to participate in technology 
standardization. It is equally evident that the firm’s long-term competitiveness and 
growth prospects influence its decision to join a standards developing organization. 
Consider the theory of Core Competence. It has been posited that core 
capabilities constitute a “wellspring of new business development” when extended to 
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adjacent market opportunities, and that they can positively impact a firm’s growth 
potential by “exploiting economies of scope.”254 255 This viewpoint is buttressed by the 
seminal works of many scholars, particularly those that have theoretical underpinnings 
in the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm, and shed light on the firm’s distinctive 
competencies and heterogeneous capabilities. 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 Proponents of RBV 
argue that firms that possess valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources 
are positioned for sustained competitiveness. The necessary conditions for such an 
advantage include superior resources, ex post limits to competition, imperfect resource 
mobility and ex ante limits to competition.263 However, within the classical economic 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, RBV is regarded as an evolutionary 
economic concept with only limited applicability, especially given the inevitable 
temporal changes in the routines and capabilities of the firm within a dynamic industry 
or ecosystem.264 Moreover, as knowledge about the value of assets and their 
combinational significance is broadly disseminated, those assets, over time, tend to 
migrate to firms that value them most.265  
With the exception of “strategic needs and social opportunities” in the formation 
of industry-wide alliances, the body of research cited above is largely silent on 
managerial strategies, in particular where it may be germane to the standardization of 
innovative technologies.266 My research highlights the importance of path-dependent 
“best practices” as a non-tautological strategy that can deliver advantage to the firm for 
long-term competitiveness through participation in the development of technology 
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standards within the ICT industry. This allows the firm to optimize its resources and its 
investments. Whether other strategies are necessary or sufficient to inform the firm’s 
decision is indeterminate and remains fertile ground for future scholarly endeavor.  
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Chapter 9: Limitations and Future Research  
There are a few limitations that can be overcome in future scholarship. There are 
also a number of interesting by-products of this treatise that deserve further probing 
and study. 
9.1 Limitations 
First, the application of the USB case entails biases in the memory of experts and 
historical learning. Consider that the USB technology was first conceived in the early 
1990s. This limitation was overcome to some extent through comparison and contrast 
with the General model. 
Second, the proposed General model has been developed and quantified with 
panelists with expertise in interconnect technology development within the ICT 
industry. Although this segment of technological innovation is crucial in the 
development of a number of indispensable products and has been the intense focus of 
standardization for many decades, yet the panel experts can be viewed as sequestered 
from other areas of non-ICT standardization efforts. While this is a minor limitation, yet 
it can be overcome through the inclusion of experts in the fields of expertise in the ICT 
industry, as well as other technical disciplines. The upside of this limitation is that the 
panelists are fully affiliated with the goals of this study. 
Third, the model has been quantified with experts that are mostly focused in de 
facto standards development. Again, this is not a significant limitation since it aligns 
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with the stated purpose and focus of this study. This limitation too can be overcome by 
incorporating data from experts in de jure standards development. 
Fourth, the use of pairwise comparisons, if not carefully analyzed, can be prone 
to a known problem referred to in scholarly research circles as the violation of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, through which a random removal of 
alternatives in the comparison matrix and subsequent re-computation may result in an 
illogical outcome, such as a previously low rated item trumping a higher one.267  
Finally, the use of judgment quantification is representative of the personal 
worldviews of the participating experts. This limitation was partially overcome through 
mitigation of the Inconsistency and Disagreement scores. 
9.2 Future Research 
With respect to a research agenda for future scholarship, the exploration of 
additional perspectives, decision criteria and decision outcomes to augment the 
framework and the proposed General model developed in this treatise constitutes 
fertile ground and could be a worthwhile pursuit for extending or customizing this 
decision framework to a broader array of applications. 
Next, the extension, application and analysis of the General model developed in 
this research to other innovations in the ICT industry or to other fields, such as service 
industries, could prove insightful and beneficial to future scholars in the field of 
technology management. 
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An interesting byproduct of this research highlights the need to probe into 
uniform IP valuation methodologies which have thus far eluded professionals in the 
field. IP valuation is important for setting licensing fees, determining transaction 
support, vetting of merger and acquisition targets, forming of strategic alliances, 
quantifying damages for infringement law suits, complying with accounting and 
regulatory requirements, ascertaining attorney malpractice awards, shaping 
intercompany transactions, defining collateral-based financing limits and many other 
applications.268 An increasing body of recent research points to a deficiency in IP 
valuation methodology. This deficiency is systemic and is based on experiential 
knowledge that vastly inconsistent results are obtained from some of the prevalent 
methods in use today.269 He identifies several methods in order of sophistication: cost, 
market, income, discounted cash flow, risk, and so on, and admits that none of these 
methods is universally applicable owing to several limitations, one of which is the lack of 
a suitable technique for estimating the variables used in the valuation methods. 
In the ICT industry firms decide to form consortia or alliances that have direct 
bearing on their IP portfolios. Proper valuation of IP contributions form the basis on 
which these alliances can come together and function for the benefit of the industry. 
Damage analysis for lawsuits involving the infringement of IP is convoluted and does not 
always resolve to a fee-simple amount. In such cases, uniform IP valuation provides 
clarity, removes uncertainty and facilitates the equitable application of the law. In most 
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accounting and regulatory environments, precise valuations are needed for entry into 
balance sheets and other financial statements.  
Further, Initial Public Offering (IPO) documents usually highlight the importance 
of the IP held by the firm but the absence of a credible valuation methodology can 
introduce risk and uncertainty in these IPO transactions. Moreover, in cases where 
attorneys fail to obtain IP rights for their clients, valuations are necessary to determine 
any losses for post facto recoupment. In most markets, various regulatory and tax 
authorities require precise valuation of IP to determine whether the transfer of IP 
among related parties must be further scrutinized for antitrust or other violations. 
Finally, in certain situations IP can be a dominant asset when it is used as collateral to 
obtain financing by a firm. Proper valuation is crucial in ensuring a successful outcome 
for the firm. Aside from aiding in all of the aforementioned commercial and legal areas, 
my research contributions will fill a void in the current academic literature by integrating 
a decision support framework with an empirically-developed IP valuation model. 
The development and application of a robust quantitative model for the 
objective valuation of patents and other intangible intellectual assets would be 
welcomed by most ICT firms. Ancillary research in IP portfolio valuation may touch on a 
number of related topics such as optimal licensing terms to balance innovation with IP 
investment recoupment, the relationship between the innovation strategies of the firm 
and the IPR policies of standards development organizations, and so on.  
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Investigating these and related issues constitute a formidable agenda to extend 
scholarship in technology standardization.  
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Appendix A: Data Collection Instruments 
 
Instrument I.1  Subject Recruitment Letter 
Dear [participant]         [date] 
 
I am Ramin Neshati, a Ph.D. candidate in the Engineering and Technology Management 
department of the Maseeh College of Engineering and Computer Science at Portland 
State University. My dissertation is titled “Participation in Technology Standards 
Development: A Decision Model for the Information and Communications Technology 
Industry.” My proposed research is significant in that it will yield a decision-support 
framework to guide technology managers in determining whether or not to join in 
technology standards development.  
 
If you volunteer to provide data for this proposed research, you will be asked to review, 
sign and return the attached Informed Consent Letter which describes mutual 
expectations for confidentiality and privacy. Please note that there are no risks to you 
should you choose to participate, and your identity and responses will be held in strict 
confidence. You may withdraw at any time without cause, compulsion or repercussion. 
Participation involves returning the attached survey instrument. There may be 
additional surveys to refine the various elements of the decision-support model. 
 
Your participation will help in the development and validation of a decision-support 
framework. The significance of this proposed research is potentially enormous as it 
bears on Intellectual Property (IP) portfolios and licensing obligations of firms that 
operate in the Information and Communications Technology industry. Your input will 
enrich the knowledge base and impact the practice of technology standardization for 
years to come. 
 
You may reach me at rn@pdx.edu for any matter pertaining to this proposed research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ramin Neshati 
 
 
Attachments: 1-Informed Consent Letter, 2-Model Development Instrument. 
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Instrument I.2  Informed Consent Letter 
Dear [participant]         [date] 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my proposed dissertation research titled 
“Participation in Technology Standards Development: A Decision Model for the 
Information and Communications Technology Industry.” The outcome of this proposed 
research will be a decision framework to assist technology managers in the ICT industry, 
such as you, to decide whether or not to standardize technological innovations. 
 
Please be aware that you are not being asked, nor are you required, to disclose any 
information that is confidential or sensitive to your firm or person. You will be asked to 
indicate your preference on a set of decision criteria by providing quantified judgments 
in a pairwise matrix of choices pertaining to technology standardization. All information 
you provide will be maintained in strict confidence and your identity will not be 
disclosed without your permission. You may withdraw from this research at any time 
without cause and will not be subjected to any negative repercussions or loss of 
confidentiality. 
 
Should you have any questions about your participation in this proposed research, 
please feel free to contact the Portland State University Human Subjects Research 
Review Committee, Office of Research Strategic Partnerships, 1600 SW Fourth Ave., 
Suite 620, Portland, OR 97201, 503-725-3423. As always, you may contact me at 
rn@pdx.edu for any technical questions related to the proposed research. 
 
Please sign, date and return this note to indicate your understanding and agreement to 
participate in this proposed research. You may e-mail it to rn@pdx.edu.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ramin Neshati 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Name (optional)   
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Signature (required)   
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Date (required)
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Instrument I.3  Model Development Instrument 
Phase 1 – Model Development Instrument 
 
The extant academic literature on technology management highlights four distinct 
perspectives which managers consider when making decisions on technology 
standardization. These perspectives are: Economic, Strategic, Organizational and Legal 
(ESOL). Are there other perspectives that should be considered in this context? If so, 
please indicate:___________________________________________________________ 
 
Using a total of 100 points, please express your judgment about the relative importance 
of the following paired items (e.g. Economic – Strategic). If the first item is 3 times more 
important than the second, distribute 75 points to the former and 25 points to the 
latter. Do not assign 0 points at any time. If you judge that one item has no importance 
in comparison to its pair, assign 1 and 99, respectively. Please rate the following pairs: 
 
Compare Preference Compare 
Economic   Strategic 
Economic   Organizational 
Economic   Legal 
Strategic   Organizational 
Strategic   Legal 
Organizational   Legal 
 
The Economic perspective is comprised of the following factors: cost of participation in 
technology standardization, and return on investment in technology standardization. 
Are there other factors that should be considered? If so, please 
indicate:_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Strategic perspective is comprised of the following factors: alignment to corporate 
objectives, scope of the standards effort, network externalities (i.e. ecosystem support), 
and appropriability (i.e. ease of adoption). Are there other factors that should be 
considered? If so, please 
indicate:_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Organizational perspective is comprised of the following factors: membership 
enrollment policy of the standards defining body (i.e. open, by-invitation, etc.), and 
geographic range of the membership (i.e. global, confined to a region, etc.). Are there 
other factors that should be considered? If so, please 
indicate:_________________________________________________________________ 
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The Legal perspective is comprised of the following factors: IPR policy, and IP disclosure 
requirement. Are there other factors that should be considered? If so, please 
indicate:_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for participating in this phase of data collection. The decision-support model I 
am developing is based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). I will follow-up on the 
updated decision model using your (and other) data and will be asking for further 
judgment quantifications on the revised model definition at each level of the decision 
hierarchy. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ramin Neshati 
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Instrument I.4  Model Validation Instrument 
Dear [participant]         [date] 
 
Thank you for participating in this important research effort; your input has been most 
useful. The attached data collection instrument pertains to Phase 2 of my dissertation 
research: model validation. The instructions are embedded in the attached instrument. I 
appreciate your time and attention. 
 
Please print, complete, scan & e-mail your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before 
10/19/12! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ramin Neshati 
 
Attachments: 1-Model Validation Instrument. 
 
 
Phase 2 – Model Validation Instrument (estimated completion time: 15 minutes) 
 
Thank you for participating in Phase 1 of this research effort. Your input, and those of 
others, has been incorporated into my model. Based on recent academic literature and 
your inputs, I have revised the preliminary AHP model on technology standardization in 
the ICT industry as shown below. Elements in solid (yellow) boxes are from the original 
model, elements in dashed boxes are additions from your inputs. 
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In Phase 2 you are asked to validate the revised model via a series of simple checklists. If 
you concur with the presence of the element, mark the “Agree” column for that entry; if 
you oppose the presence of the element, mark the “Disagree” column for that entry. 
Note: I am NOT asking for your input on the computed weights, only the model 
elements. 
 
Please print, complete, scan & e-mail your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before 
10/19/12! 
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Please express your [dis]agreement on the model’s Perspectives in the checklist below: 
 
Perspectives Agree Disagree 
Economic   
Strategic   
Organizational   
Legal   
Environmental/Societal   
 
Please express your [dis]agreement on the Economic criteria in the checklist below: 
 
Economic Criteria Agree Disagree 
Market Expansion (growth of TAM)   
Opportunity Cost (other use of resources)   
R&D Savings (savings through learning w/ min invest.)   
IP Revenue (income from licensing)   
TTM Incentive (fast product intro)   
Cost – Absence (loss from non-participation)   
Cost – Presence (expenses for participation, giveaways)   
Tangible ROI (investment recoupment)   
Intangible ROI (leadership, etc.)   
 
Please express your [dis]agreement on the Strategic criteria in the checklist below: 
 
Strategic Criteria Agree Disagree 
Enabling Rivals (rivals gain at no cost)   
Grow Expertise (build tech/market savvy)   
Develop Adjacency (new skills/tech/…)   
Alternative Technologies (invent around)   
Trend/Disruption (avoid surprise)   
Technology Scope (delimit scope for predictability)   
Appropriability (ease of adoption)   
Network Externality (ecosystem support)   
Product Alignment (BU alignment with market)   
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Please express your [dis]agreement on the Organizational criteria in the checklist below: 
 
Organizational Criteria Agree Disagree 
Governance (BoD, officers, elections, committees, etc.)   
Funding (income, expenses, grants, etc.)   
Certification Program (logo, compliance testing, etc.)   
Rules/Procedures (operating structure)   
Efficiency (responsive to market needs)   
Technology/Market Focus (develop-only, promote, …)   
Member Contribution (ease of participation)   
Partnerships (collaborations, liaisons, …)   
Enrollment Policy (member recruitment, geo reach, …)   
Membership Depth (limited, complete, …)   
 
Please express your [dis]agreement on the Legal criteria in the checklist below: 
 
Legal Criteria Agree Disagree 
Incorporation (legal status of the SDO)   
Tax (tax treatment of the SDO)   
Antitrust (policies of the SDO)   
IP Disclosure (disclosure rules/requirements)   
IPR Licensing (model used by the SDO)   
 
Please express your [dis]agreement on the Environmental criteria in the checklist below: 
 
Environmental Criteria Agree Disagree 
Government Regulation (e.g. “green,” social, …)   
Technology Diffusion (policies, barriers, etc.)   
 
Thank you for participating in the model validation phase of my research. I will follow-up 
with the revised, validated model using your (and others’) input and will ask for 
additional pairwise judgment quantifications at the criteria and sub-criteria levels of the 
hierarchy. 
  
Sincerely, 
 
Ramin Neshati 
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Instrument I.5  Model Quantification Instrument - Criteria 
Dear [participant]         [date] 
 
Thank you for participating in this important research effort; I have incorporated your 
input, as well as those of other participants, in the validated decision model. In this the 
3rd phase of data collection, I am looking for your quantified judgment on the 
importance of various criteria in the decision model when compared in a pairwise 
manner. The instructions are embedded in the attached document. 
 
Please complete and send your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before 11/16/2012! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ramin Neshati 
 
Attachments: 1-Criteria Judgment Quantification Instrument. 
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Phase 3 – Model Quantification Instrument (estimated completion time: 30 min) 
 
Thank you for participating in my research on technology standardization in the ICT 
industry. Based on your input I have refined the decision model as shown below:  
 
 
 
Some elements that existed in the prior model were removed on the strength of the 
preferential inconsistency among respondents. Specifically, elements with less than 
2/3rd collective agreement of the respondents were dropped from further 
consideration. 
 
In Phase 3, you are asked to quantitatively rate the decision criteria. Using a total of 100 
points, please express your judgment about the relative importance of the paired items 
in the following four tables. For example, if the first item is 3 times more important than 
its pair, distribute 75 points to the former and 25 points to the latter. Do not assign 0 at 
any time. If you judge that one item has no importance in comparison to its pair, assign 
1 and 99 points, respectively. I have included a glossary at the end of this document for 
your reference. Please e-mail the completed questionnaire to rn@pdx.edu. Should it 
facilitate your response, I can send the Word version of this document upon request. 
Thank you. 
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Please rate the following Economic criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row. 
 
Economic Criteria Preference Score Economic Criteria 
Market Expansion   Opportunity Cost 
Market Expansion   R&D Savings 
Market Expansion   IP Revenue 
Market Expansion   Cost of Absence 
Market Expansion   Cost of Presence 
Market Expansion   Tangible ROI/Recoupment 
Opportunity Cost   R&D Savings 
Opportunity Cost   IP Revenue 
Opportunity Cost   Cost of Absence 
Opportunity Cost   Cost of Presence 
Opportunity Cost   Tangible ROI/Recoupment 
R&D Savings   IP Revenue 
R&D Savings   Cost of Absence 
R&D Savings   Cost of Presence 
R&D Savings   Tangible ROI/Recoupment 
IP Revenue   Cost of Absence 
IP Revenue   Cost of Presence 
IP Revenue   Tangible ROI/Recoupment 
Cost of Absence   Cost of Presence 
Cost of Absence   Tangible ROI/Recoupment 
Cost of Presence   Tangible ROI/Recoupment 
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Please rate the following Strategic criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row. 
 
Strategic Criteria Preference Score Strategic Criteria 
Grow Expertise   Trends/Disruptions 
Grow Expertise   Appropriability 
Grow Expertise   Network Externality 
Grow Expertise   Product Alignment 
Grow Expertise   Intangible ROI/Leadership 
Grow Expertise   Technology Diffusion 
Trends/Disruptions   Appropriability 
Trends/Disruptions   Network Externality 
Trends/Disruptions   Product Alignment 
Trends/Disruptions   Intangible ROI/Leadership 
Trends/Disruptions   Technology Diffusion 
Appropriability   Network Externality 
Appropriability   Product Alignment 
Appropriability   Intangible ROI/Leadership 
Appropriability   Technology Diffusion 
Network Externality   Product Alignment 
Network Externality   Intangible ROI/Leadership 
Network Externality   Technology Diffusion 
Product Alignment   Intangible ROI/Leadership 
Product Alignment   Technology Diffusion 
Intangible ROI/Leadership   Technology Diffusion 
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Please rate the following Organizational criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row. 
 
Organizational Criteria Preference Score Organizational Criteria 
Governance   Funding 
Governance   Certification Program 
Governance   Rules/Procedures 
Governance   Organizational Efficiency 
Governance   Focus (Tech/Market) 
Governance   Member Contributions 
Governance   Partnerships 
Governance   Enrollment Policies 
Funding   Certification Program 
Funding   Rules/Procedures 
Funding   Organizational Efficiency 
Funding   Focus (Tech/Market) 
Funding   Member Contributions 
Funding   Partnerships 
Funding   Enrollment Policies 
Certification Program   Rules/Procedures 
Certification Program   Organizational Efficiency 
Certification Program   Focus (Tech/Market) 
Certification Program   Member Contributions 
Certification Program   Partnerships 
Certification Program   Enrollment Policies 
Rules/Procedures   Organizational Efficiency 
Rules/Procedures   Focus (Tech/Market)  
Rules/Procedures   Member Contributions 
Rules/Procedures   Partnerships 
Rules/Procedures   Enrollment Policies 
Organizational Efficiency   Focus (Tech/Market)  
Organizational Efficiency   Member Contributions 
Organizational Efficiency   Partnerships 
Organizational Efficiency   Enrollment Policies 
Focus (Tech/Market)   Member Contributions 
Focus (Tech/Market)   Partnerships 
Focus (Tech/Market)   Enrollment Policies 
Member Contributions   Partnerships 
Member Contributions   Enrollment Policies 
Partnerships   Enrollment Policies 
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Please rate the following Legal criteria. Scores must sum to 100 in each row. 
 
Legal Criteria Preference Score Legal Criteria 
Incorporation   Antitrust Policy 
Incorporation   IP Disclosure Requirement 
Incorporation   IPR Licensing Model 
Incorporation   Government Regulation 
Antitrust Policy   IP Disclosure Requirement 
Antitrust Policy   IPR Licensing Model 
Antitrust Policy   Government Regulation 
IP Disclosure Requirement   IPR Licensing Model 
IP Disclosure Requirement   Government Regulation 
IPR Licensing Model   Government Regulation 
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Instrument I.6  Model Quantification Instrument - Outcomes 
Dear [participant]         [date] 
 
Thank you for participating in this important research effort. In this the 4th and last 
phase of data collection, I am looking for your quantified judgment on the importance of 
various decision alternatives when compared in a pairwise manner against the criteria. 
The instructions are embedded in the attached document. 
 
Please complete and send your response to rn@pdx.edu by/before 5/31/2013! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ramin Neshati 
 
Attachments: 1-Alternatives Judgment Quantification Instrument. 
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Phase 4 – Model Quantification Instrument (estimated completion time: 30 min) 
 
Thank you for participating in my research on technology standardization in the ICT 
industry.  
 
In Phase 4, you are asked to quantitatively rate the decision alternatives. Using a total of 
100 points, please express your judgment about the relative importance of the paired 
items in the following tables. For example, if the first item is 3 times more important 
than its pair, distribute 75 points to the former and 25 points to the latter. Do not assign 
0 at any time. If you judge that one item has no importance in comparison to its pair, 
assign 1 and 99 points, respectively. I have included a glossary at the end of this 
document for your reference. Please e-mail the completed questionnaire to 
rn@pdx.edu. Should it facilitate your response, I can send the Word version of this 
document upon request. Thank you. 
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Economic Criteria 
ME  OC  RD  IR  CA 
O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2 
O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3 
O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4 
O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3 
O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4 
O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4 
 
CP  TR   
O1   O2  O1   O2  
O1   O3  O1   O3  
O1   O4  O1   O4  
O2   O3  O2   O3  
O2   O4  O2   O4  
O3   O4  O3   O4  
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Strategic Criteria 
GE  TD  AP  NE  PA 
O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2 
O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3 
O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4 
O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3 
O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4 
O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4 
 
IR  DT   
O1   O2  O1   O2  
O1   O3  O1   O3  
O1   O4  O1   O4  
O2   O3  O2   O3  
O2   O4  O2   O4  
O3   O4  O3   O4  
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Organizational Criteria 
GO  FU  CP  RP  OE 
O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2 
O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3 
O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4 
O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3 
O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4 
O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4 
 
FO  MC  PA  EP   
O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  
O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  
O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  
O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  
O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  
O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  
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Legal Criteria 
IN  AN  ID  IL  GR 
O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2  O1   O2 
O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3  O1   O3 
O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4  O1   O4 
O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3  O2   O3 
O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4  O2   O4 
O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4  O3   O4 
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Appendix B: Expert Panel Data 
 
 
